Path: ...!news.mixmin.net!weretis.net!feeder9.news.weretis.net!i2pn.org!i2pn2.org!.POSTED!not-for-mail From: Richard Damon Newsgroups: sci.logic,comp.theory Subject: Re: True on the basis of meaning --- Good job Richard ! ---Socratic method Date: Fri, 17 May 2024 22:40:01 -0400 Organization: i2pn2 (i2pn.org) Message-ID: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Injection-Date: Sat, 18 May 2024 02:40:01 -0000 (UTC) Injection-Info: i2pn2.org; logging-data="1380276"; mail-complaints-to="usenet@i2pn2.org"; posting-account="diqKR1lalukngNWEqoq9/uFtbkm5U+w3w6FQ0yesrXg"; User-Agent: Mozilla Thunderbird In-Reply-To: Content-Language: en-US X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 4.0.0 Bytes: 8463 Lines: 207 On 5/17/24 10:19 PM, olcott wrote: > On 5/17/2024 8:33 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >> On 5/17/24 9:22 PM, olcott wrote: >>> On 5/17/2024 8:07 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>> >>>>> On 5/13/2024 7:29 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>  > Remember, p defined as ~True(L, p) ... >>>>> >>>>> You already admitted that True(L,p) and False(L,p) both return false. >>>>> This is the correct value that these predicates correctly derived. >>>> >>>> Right, but that also means that we can show that True(L, true) >>>> returns false, which says your logic system is broken by being >>>> inconsistant. >>>> >>> >>> Not at all. Your version of the Truth Teller paradox has >>> the conventional lack of a truth object as the Liar Paradox >>> and the Truth Teller paradox: What are they true about? >> >> In other words, you logic doesn't have an absolute idea of truth!!! >> > > It does have an immutably correct notion of {true on the basis > of meaning} and rejects finite strings as not truth bearers on > this basis. Nope, because you said the value of "true" doesn't exist, truth is dependent on having something to make true. > >> The object that made the statement true, was that True(L, p) said that >> p wasn't true. >> > > *You agreed that True(L, p) is false and False(L,p) is false* > *You agreed that True(L, p) is false and False(L,p) is false* > *You agreed that True(L, p) is false and False(L,p) is false* Yes, which makes True(L, a sentence proven to be true) to be false. Thus, it is inconsistant. Or we can use the arguement that since p is ~True(L, p) which is false that p is alse ~True(L, ~True(L, p) which, since True(L, p) is "established" to be false, and thus ~True(L,p) to be true, we can say that True(L, ~True(L, p) must be true and thus p, being not that is false. So, we can prove that p is both false and true, and thus your system is BY DEFINITION inconsistant. > >>> >>> This sentence is true. >>> What is it true about? >>> It is true about being true. >>> What is it is true about being true about? >>> >>> This turns out to be Kripke ungrounded yet Kripke did >>> not know the algorithmic basis for Kripke grounding. >>> >>> *Outline of a Theory of Truth Saul Kripke* (1975) >>> https://www.impan.pl/~kz/truthseminar/Kripke_Outline.pdf >>> >>> >>>>> >>>>> It seems that now you are now disagreeing with your own self. You are >>>>> saying the predicates are broken BECAUSE THEY RETURN THE CORRECT >>>>> VALUE. >>>>> >>>> >>>> No, your logic system disagrees with itself, I am just pointing that >>>> out. >>>> >>> >>> All that you pointed out is that you still don't understand >>> the Truth Teller paradox. >> >> No, YOU don't understand that True MUST be a truth beared, or you are >> just a liar that your system has a Truth Predicate. >> >> >> Remember, we started with >> >> p in L is ~True(L, p) >> you say True(L, p) is false > > *No you said this* (Socratic question) No, YOU said it first, and I agreed. What else are you going to make it? (Socratic reply question) > >> thus the truth value of p MUST be true, since it is not the falseness >> of True(L, p) >> > > We test p for True or False if neither it is tossed out on its ass. > > It is like we are testing if a person is hungry: > We ask is the person dead? The answer is yes and then you > say what if they are still hungry? > RED HERRINBG. Since you have claimed that True(L, p) is false, by the stipulated definition of p, it MUST be a true statement, and thus you have stiplated that True(L, ) turns out to be false (since that statement IS p), and thus you system is >> Thus we can say that p is also the equivalent in L of >> > > We sure as Hell cannot correctly say that. Why not? > > *THE ONE LEVEL OF INDIRECT REFERENCE CHANGES EVERYTHING* > *THE ONE LEVEL OF INDIRECT REFERENCE CHANGES EVERYTHING* > *THE ONE LEVEL OF INDIRECT REFERENCE CHANGES EVERYTHING* In other words, you system doesn't allow the assignement of a statement to have a refenece to itself, which is one of the criteria in Tarski. > >> ~True(L, ~True(L, p)) > > ~True(English, ~True(English, "a fish")) is true > ~True(English, ~True(English, "This sentence is not true")) is true > ~True(English, ~True(English, "This sentence is true")) is true Nope, "This statment is true" is different then the statement: P, in L, is defined as ~True(L, P) It it just P in L is defined as "P is not true." The difference is the statement P is not true has the possibility of being a non-truth bearer, but the predicate True(L, p) doesn't have that option. > >> >> Which since we showed that True(L, p) was false, that means that the >> outer True predicate sees a true statement (since it is the negation >> of a false statement) > > ~True(English, ~True(English, "a fish")) is true Yep. > >>  and thus True(L, ~True(L, p)) is true, and thus we can show that p ========== REMAINDER OF ARTICLE TRUNCATED ==========