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From: Martin Harran <martinharran@gmail.com>
Newsgroups: talk.origins
Subject: Re: Making your mind up
Date: Tue, 14 May 2024 11:35:09 +0100
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On Fri, 3 May 2024 18:04:14 -0500, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>
wrote:

>On 2024-05-03 11:40 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
>> On Thu, 2 May 2024 14:04:53 -0500, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>
>> wrote:
>> 
>>> On 2024-05-02 12:46 PM, Bob Casanova wrote:
>> 
>> [..]
>> 
>>>>>
>>>>> My understanding of the "probabilistic nature of base reality" is that
>>>>> some subatomic events are truly random and can have, over the long term,
>>>>> gross effects and very occasionally immediate gross effects.
>>>>>
>>>> Usually more the former than the latter, but yes, I believe
>>>> that is correct.
>>>>>
>>>>> How does
>>>>> this allow for "something resembling choice"?
>>>>>>>
>>>> It would mean that the universe is not, as Newton believed
>>>> and as Planck disproved, "clockwork". And this in turn means
>>>> (to me, at least) that events are not strictly the result of
>>>> prior events; i.e., not fully deterministic. So if free will
>>>> (or choice, if you prefer) and strict determinism are the
>>>> only possibilities then free will, while restricted, is
>>>> possible.
>>>
>>> How does that possible random variation resemble 'free will' in any way?
>>> What would be the restriction?
>> 
>> "Resemble" seems a peculiar choice of word there. ISTM that randomness
>> contradict determinism but neither supports nor contradicts free will.
>> Randomness creates options, free will decides which one we select.
>
>I think you misunderstand how random events work in this case. Before 
>the random event takes place there may be multiple possibilities for the 
>following instant. Once the random event takes place, all but one of 
>those possibilities is gone. There are no more multiple options. random 
>events do not create options to choose from, they make it predictions 
>about what actually happens less accurate. Most truly random events have 
>no differential effect on the immediate future. For a dramatic example, 
>take an atomic bomb. When the critical mass is formed it doesn't matter 
>which of the uranium atoms is the first to randomly decay, the bomb 
>still detonates.
>> 
>> Let's say I was in the shop today and decided to do a "Quick Pick" for
>> this weekend's lottery i.e. the numbers are selected at random by the
>> machine in the shop, not selected by me. Those numbers come up in the
>> lottery and I win a heap of money. That is a totally random event
>> unless someone wants to explain how it was determined that the machine
>> in the shop and the lottery machine both picked those numbers.
>
>They are not truly random numbers, they are just generated in a way that 
>is so sensitive to the surrounding conditions that it is impossible to 
>get enough information to predict them.
>> 
>> After that random event, I now have a number of choices; I could blow
>> the money on things I always fancied like that Ferrari and the luxury
>> villa in Spain; I could provide financial security for my kids; I
>> could support my favourite charities; I could do a mixture of those
>> things. Those choices are where my free will comes in.
>> 
>That's just going back to your initial claims about choice which have 
>nothing to do with randomness or the argument I was making.

My point here was not to argue further in favour of those initial
claims, it was simply to show that randomness, however you define it,
is not an issue for free will as I described it in those initial
claims.

>> [...]
>> 
>
>--