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From: Michael S <already5chosen@yahoo.com>
Newsgroups: comp.arch
Subject: Re: Byte Addressability And Beyond
Date: Wed, 5 Jun 2024 20:15:53 +0300
Organization: A noiseless patient Spider
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On Wed, 5 Jun 2024 17:04:49 +0000
mitchalsup@aol.com (MitchAlsup1) wrote:

> Michael S wrote:
>=20
> > On Wed, 5 Jun 2024 13:34:25 -0000 (UTC)
> >  =20
>=20
> > The best, the most secure encryption is an end-to-end encryption.
> > Which means application-to-application. =20
>=20
> Except for the Spectr=C3=A9 like attacks that steal the keys if they are =
in
> memory.
>=20

Spectre, not Spectr=C3=A9
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spectre_(security_vulnerability)

> > It's not that other, "piece-wise" encryption types can't be used,
> > but if you are serious about privacy you should consider them
> > insufficient. =20

And who exactly places the key into registers of your beloved shared
encryption device? And, since device is shared, who exchanges keys
hundreds or thousands times per second? Not software? Not via memory?
It all makes situation much much worse rather than better.