Date: Tue, 27 May 2025 18:32:25 +0200
From: D <J@M>
Subject: Deanonymizing Pseudonymity
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Message-Id: <20250527.183225.1b44c8cf@msgid.frell.theremailer.net>
Newsgroups: misc.phone.mobile.iphone
Path: news.eternal-september.org!eternal-september.org!feeder3.eternal-september.org!news.szaf.org!3.eu.feeder.erje.net!feeder.erje.net!news2.arglkargh.de!sewer!news.dizum.net!not-for-mail
Organization: dizum.com - The Internet Problem Provider
X-Abuse: abuse@dizum.com
Injection-Info: sewer.dizum.com - 2001::1/128


(quoting links recently posted in <news:20250527.095215.9aa06e66@yamn.paranoici.org>)  
 
(using Tor Browser 14.5.2) 
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1016/j.cose.2019.101684 
>Deanonymizing Tor hidden service users through Bitcoin transactions analysis   
>Authors: Husam Al Jawaheri, Mashael Al Sabah, Yazan Boshmaf, Aiman Erbad Authors Info
>& Claims 
>Volume 89, Issue C
>https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2019.101684 
>Published: 01 February 2020 Publication History   
>ACM Digital Library 
>Abstract 
>With the rapid increase of threats on the Internet, people are continuously seeking 
>privacy and anonymity. Services such as Bitcoin and Tor were introduced to provide  
>anonymity for online transactions and Web browsing. Due to its pseudonymity model,
>Bitcoin lacks retroactive operational security, which means historical pieces of 
>information could be used to identify a certain user. By exploiting publicly available
>information, we show how relying on Bitcoin for payments on Tor hidden services could   
>lead to deanonymization of these services¢ users. Such linking is possible by finding 
>at least one past transaction in the Blockchain that involves their publicly declared
>Bitcoin addresses.
>To demonstrate the consequences of this deanonymization approach, we carried out a   
>real-world experiment simulating a passive, limited adversary. We crawled 1.5K hidden 
>services and collected 88 unique and active Bitcoin addresses. We then crawled 5B 
>tweets and 1M BitcoinTalk forum pages and collected 4.2K and 41K unique Bitcoin
>addresses, respectively. Each user address was associated with an online identity along 
>with its public profile information. By analyzing the transactions in the Blockchain,
>we were able to link 125 unique users to 20 hidden services, including sensitive ones,  
>such as The Pirate Bay and Silk Road. We also analyzed two case studies in detail to
>demonstrate the implications of the information leakage on users anonymity. In 
>particular, we confirm that Bitcoin addresses should be considered exploitable, as they 
>can be used to deanonymize users retroactively. This is especially important for Tor 
>hidden service users who actively seek and expect privacy and anonymity.
>References   
>... 
[end quoted excerpt]  
 
(using Tor Browser 14.5.2) 
https://dl.acm.org/doi/abs/10.1145/3589335.3651487  
>Deanonymizing Transactions Originating from Monero Tor Hidden Service Nodes 
>Authors: Ruisheng Shi, Yulian Ge, Lina Lan, Zhiyuan Peng, Shenwen Lin, Lin Li Authors
>Info & Claims
>WWW '24: Companion Proceedings of the ACM Web Conference 2024  
>Pages 678 - 681  
>https://doi.org/10.1145/3589335.3651487
>Published: 13 May 2024 Publication History  
>Get Access 
>WWW '24: Companion Proceedings of the ACM Web Conference 2024 
>Deanonymizing Transactions Originating from Monero Tor Hidden Service Nodes
>Pages 678 - 681
>ACM Digital Library  
>Abstract 
>Monero is a privacy-focused cryptocurrency that incorporates anonymity networks (such 
>as Tor and I2P) and deploys the Dandelion++ protocol to prevent malicious attackers   
>from linking transactions with their source IPs. However, this paper highlights a
>vulnerability in Monero's integration of the Tor network, which allows an attacker to 
>successfully deanonymize transactions originating from Monero Tor hidden service nodes
>at the network-layer level.  
>Our approach involves injecting malicious Monero Tor hidden service nodes into the 
>Monero P2P network to correlate the onion addresses of incoming Monero Tor hidden  
>service peers with their originating transactions. And by sending a signal watermark 
>embedded with the onion address to the Tor circuit, we establish a correlation between
>the onion address and IP address of a Monero Tor hidden service node. Ultimately, we
>correlate transactions and IPs of Monero Tor hidden service nodes.   
>Through experimentation on the Monero testnet, we provide empirical evidence of the  
>effectiveness of our approach in successfully deanonymizing transactions originating 
>from Monero Tor hidden service nodes. 
>Supplemental Material
>MP4 File  
>Supplemental video 
> Download   7.23 MB
>  https://dl.acm.org/doi/suppl/10.1145/3589335.3651487/suppl_file/shp4046.mp4 
>References 
>...     
[end quoted excerpt]  
 
p.s.  the best advice i've ever read about big money is to "avoid not evade"