Path: ...!weretis.net!feeder9.news.weretis.net!i2pn.org!i2pn2.org!.POSTED!not-for-mail
From: Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org>
Newsgroups: sci.logic
Subject: Re: I just fixed the loophole of the Gettier cases
Date: Mon, 9 Sep 2024 22:58:41 -0400
Organization: i2pn2 (i2pn.org)
Message-ID: <21a18ba6c83ae541c5cd942dc7c73ba91b258bf2@i2pn2.org>
References: <vb0lj5$1c1kh$1@dont-email.me> <vb1o9g$1g7lq$1@dont-email.me>
 <vb3t1j$22k1l$1@dont-email.me> <vb4aq6$2r7ok$1@dont-email.me>
 <vb6p9v$3aebo$1@dont-email.me> <vb70k8$3b4ub$2@dont-email.me>
 <vbepsc$q8v6$1@dont-email.me> <vbes94$punj$12@dont-email.me>
 <24f85bcd40f57685aab93d45f15501178e526d0f@i2pn2.org>
 <vbh3td$1a0lq$1@dont-email.me> <vbnbps$2g6vo$2@dont-email.me>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Injection-Date: Tue, 10 Sep 2024 02:58:41 -0000 (UTC)
Injection-Info: i2pn2.org;
	logging-data="1470041"; mail-complaints-to="usenet@i2pn2.org";
	posting-account="diqKR1lalukngNWEqoq9/uFtbkm5U+w3w6FQ0yesrXg";
User-Agent: Mozilla Thunderbird
Content-Language: en-US
In-Reply-To: <vbnbps$2g6vo$2@dont-email.me>
X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 4.0.0
Bytes: 5908
Lines: 110

On 9/9/24 1:38 PM, olcott wrote:
> On 9/7/2024 3:46 AM, Mikko wrote:
>> On 2024-09-06 23:41:16 +0000, Richard Damon said:
>>
>>> On 9/6/24 8:24 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 9/6/2024 6:43 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>>> On 2024-09-03 12:49:11 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>>
>>>>>> On 9/3/2024 5:44 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>>>>> On 2024-09-02 12:24:38 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On 9/2/2024 3:29 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>>>>>>> On 2024-09-01 12:56:16 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> On 8/31/2024 10:04 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>> *I just fixed the loophole of the Gettier cases*
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> knowledge is a justified true belief such that the
>>>>>>>>>>> justification is sufficient reason to accept the
>>>>>>>>>>> truth of the belief.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> With a Justified true belief, in the Gettier cases
>>>>>>>>>> the observer does not know enough to know its true
>>>>>>>>>> yet it remains stipulated to be true.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> My original correction to this was a JTB such that the
>>>>>>>>>> justification necessitates the truth of the belief.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> With a [Sufficiently Justified belief], it is stipulated
>>>>>>>>>> that the observer does have a sufficient reason to accept
>>>>>>>>>> the truth of the belief.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> What could be a sufficient reason? Every justification of every
>>>>>>>>> belief involves other belifs that could be false.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> For the justification to be sufficient the consequence of
>>>>>>>> the belief must be semantically entailed by its justification.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> If the belief is about something real then its justification
>>>>>>> involves claims about something real. Nothing real is certain.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I don't think that is correct.
>>>>>> My left hand exists right now even if it is
>>>>>> a mere figment of my own imagination and five
>>>>>> minutes ago never existed.
>>>>>
>>>>> As I don't know and can't (at least now) verify whether your left
>>>>> hand exists or ever existed I can't regard that as a counter-
>>>>> example.
>>>>>
>>>>>>> If the belief is not about something real then it is not clear
>>>>>>> whether it is correct to call it "belief".
>>>>>>
>>>>>> *An axiomatic chain of inference based on this*
>>>>>> By the theory of simple types I mean the doctrine which says
>>>>>> that the objects of thought (or, in another interpretation,
>>>>>> the symbolic expressions) are divided into types, namely:
>>>>>> individuals, properties of individuals, relations between
>>>>>> individuals, properties of such relations, etc.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> ...sentences of the form: " a has the property φ ", " b bears
>>>>>> the relation R to c ", etc. are meaningless, if a, b, c, R, φ
>>>>>> are not of types fitting together.
>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_type_theory#G%C3%B6del_1944
>>>>>
>>>>> The concepts of knowledge and truth are applicable to the knowledge
>>>>> whether that is what certain peple meant when using those words.
>>>>> Whether or to what extent that theory can be said to be true is
>>>>> another problem.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> The fundamental architectural overview of all Prolog implementations
>>>> is the same True(x) means X is derived by applying Rules (AKA truth 
>>>> preserving operations) to Facts.
>>>
>>> But Prolog can't even handle full first order logic, only basic 
>>> propositions.
>>
>> The logic behind Prolog is restricted enough that incompleteness cannot
>> be differentiated from consistency. It seems that Olcott wants a logic
>> with that impossibility.
>>
> 
> It is not that incompleteness cannot be differentiated
> from inconsistency it is that the inconsistency of
> self-contradiction has been mistaken for undecidability
> instead of invalid input.

But the statement that Godel proved to be true but not provable in PA 
wasn't self-contradictory.

You are just proving your own stupidity.

> 
>  From the mistake of undecidability incompleteness is
> mistaken to occur.
> 
> This happens because even most modern philosophers are
> too stupid to understand that self-contradictory expressions
> such as the Liar Paradox are not truth-bearers thus must
> be rejected as invalid input.
> 

No, you are just to stupid to understand that you don't know what you 
are talking about, and just proving that you are nothing but a pathetic 
ignorant pathological lying idiot that can't understand that he doesn't 
kow what he is talking about because he brainwashed himself with his lies.