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From: Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org>
Newsgroups: comp.theory
Subject: Re: Why Tarski is wrong --- Montague, Davidson and Knowledge Ontology
 providing situational context.
Date: Sat, 22 Mar 2025 09:37:11 -0400
Organization: i2pn2 (i2pn.org)
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On 3/22/25 2:16 AM, Richard Heathfield wrote:
> On 21/03/2025 23:48, Richard Damon wrote:
>> On 3/21/25 4:20 PM, Richard Heathfield wrote:
>>> On 21/03/2025 19:30, Keith Thompson wrote:
>>>> My understanding is that Gödel proved that there are statements
>>>> that are true but not provable.
>>>
>>> Yes. Incompleteness.
>>>
>>>> It's still not possible for both
>>>> X and not-X to be provable.  If proofs exist for both, at least
>>>> one of the proofs must be flawed.
>>>
>>> I'd be interested to see a proof of that conjecture.
>>>
>>
>> It comes from the definition of consistency.
> 
> <sigh> So much for my sense of humour, which is showing distinct signs 
> of rust.
> 
>>
>> If something is provable, then it must be true, as the proof shows the 
>> path from the fundamental truths the the stateemnt, establishing its 
>> truth.
> 
> I am tempted to argue that we may instead deduce that one of the 
> fundamental truths isn't as true as it's supposed to be. But... peace! I 
> will not argue that, because it's the stuff that crankitude is made of, 
> and while crankinosity may be something I'd enjoy flirting with, I 
> simply don't have the time.
> 

Its perfectly fine to try to argue about what we should use as a 
definition of truth, over in the area of General Philosophy, The problem 
is that in the fields of Logic, that definition has been fixed and can't 
be changed.

Good discussion in the right place, Awful one in the wrong place.