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Subject: [digest] 2025 Week 7
Date: Mon, 17 Feb 2025 03:25:19 -0000
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## In this issue

1. [2023/1536] Leaky McEliece: Secret Key Recovery From Highly ...
2. [2024/1572] Bounded Collusion-Resistant Registered Functional ...
3. [2024/1593] Stateful Communication with Malicious Parties
4. [2025/191] Adaptive Distributional Security: A Framework for ...
5. [2025/197] Cryptanalysis of a nonlinear filter-based stream cipher
6. [2025/202] Distributed Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge Proofs
7. [2025/203] Ciphertext-Simulatable HE from BFV with Randomized ...
8. [2025/204] Simpler and Stronger Models for Deniable Authentication
9. [2025/205] Addressing Scalability Issues of Blockchains with ...
10. [2025/206] Revisiting the Differential-Linear Attacks on ...
11. [2025/207] Efficient Mixed Garbling from Homomorphic Secret ...
12. [2025/208] Reductions Between Code Equivalence Problems
13. [2025/209] NovaTEE: Private Clearing and Settlement on Trusted ...
14. [2025/210] Practical Keyword Private Information Retrieval ...
15. [2025/211] Prior-Based Label Differential Privacy via Secure ...
16. [2025/212] Constructing Quantum Implementations with the ...
17. [2025/213] An Innovative Lightweight Symmetric Encryption ...
18. [2025/214] Rejected Challenges Pose New Challenges: Key ...
19. [2025/215] A note on the genus of the HAWK lattice
20. [2025/216] Practical Circuit Privacy/Sanitization for TFHE
21. [2025/217] Assumption-Free Fuzzy PSI via Predicate Encryption
22. [2025/218] LSM Trees in Adversarial Environments
23. [2025/219] Slot a la carte: Centralization Issues in ...
24. [2025/220] The Quantum Decoherence Model: Everlasting ...
25. [2025/221] Uniformly Most Powerful Tests for Ad Hoc ...
26. [2025/222] A Robust Variant of ChaCha20-Poly1305
27. [2025/223] Building Hard Problems by Combining Easy Ones: ...
28. [2025/224] Lightweight Single-Server PIR with ...
29. [2025/225] =E2=80=9CCheck-Before-you-Solve=E2=80=9D: Verifiable Time-lock=
 Puzzles
30. [2025/226] Improved Subfield Curve Search For Specific Field ...
31. [2025/227] Two Is All It Takes: Asymptotic and Concrete ...
32. [2025/228] Network agnostic consensus in constant time
33. [2025/229] ETK: External-Operations TreeKEM and the Security ...
34. [2025/230] Privately Constrained PRFs from DCR: Puncturing and ...
35. [2025/231] NoIC: PAKE from KEM without Ideal Ciphers
36. [2025/232] Authenticated BitGC for Actively Secure Rate-One 2PC
37. [2025/233] Anamorphic Resistant Encryption: the Good, the Bad ...
38. [2025/234] Merkle Mountain Ranges are Optimal: On witness ...
39. [2025/235] Doubly Efficient Cryptography: Commitments, ...
40. [2025/236] Diamond iO: A Straightforward Construction of ...
41. [2025/237] UC-Security of Encrypted Key Exchange: A Tutorial
42. [2025/238] On the Power of Polynomial Preprocessing: Proving ...
43. [2025/239] DART: Decentralized, Anonymous, and Regulation- ...
44. [2025/240] Robust Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge Combiners
45. [2025/241] IBE-IBE: Intent-Based Execution through Identity- ...
46. [2025/242] Rational Secret Sharing with Competition
47. [2025/243] K-Linkable Ring Signatures and Applications in ...
48. [2025/244] Provable Speedups for SVP Approximation Under ...
49. [2025/245] Silent Circuit Relinearisation: Sublinear-Size ...
50. [2025/246] Towards Optimal Early Stopping Agreement Protocols
51. [2025/247] LatticeFold+: Faster, Simpler, Shorter Lattice- ...
52. [2025/248] New Exchanged Boomerang Distinguishers for 5-Round AES

## 2023/1536

* Title: Leaky McEliece: Secret Key Recovery From Highly Erroneous Side-Chann=
el Information
* Authors: Marcus Brinkmann, Chitchanok Chuengsatiansup, Alexander May, Julia=
n Nowakowski, Yuval Yarom
* [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/1536)
* [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/1536.pdf)

### Abstract

The McEliece cryptosystem is a strong contender for post-quantum schemes, inc=
luding key encapsulation for confidentiality of key exchanges in network prot=
ocols.

A McEliece secret key is a structured parity check matrix that is transformed=
 via Gaussian elimination into an unstructured public key. We show that this =
transformation is highly critical with respect to side-channel leakage. We as=
sume leakage of the elementary row operations during Gaussian elimination, mo=
tivated by McEliece implementations in the cryptographic libraries Classic Mc=
Eliece and Botan.

We propose a novel decoding algorithm to reconstruct a secret key from its pu=
blic key with information from a Gaussian transformation leak. Even if the ob=
tained side-channel leakage is extremely noisy, i.e., each bit is flipped wit=
h probability as high as =CF=84 =E2=89=88 0.4, we succeed to recover the secr=
et key in a matter of minutes for all proposed (Classic) McEliece instantiati=
ons. Remarkably, for high-security McEliece parameters, our attack is more po=
werful in the sense that it can tolerate even larger =CF=84.

We demonstrate our attack on the constant-time reference implementation of Cl=
assic McEliece in a single-trace setting, using an STM32L592 ARM processor.

Our result stresses the necessity of properly protecting highly structured co=
de-based schemes such as McEliece against side-channel leakage.



## 2024/1572

* Title: Bounded Collusion-Resistant Registered Functional Encryption for Cir=
cuits
* Authors: Yijian Zhang, Jie Chen, Debiao He, Yuqing Zhang
* [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1572)
* [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1572.pdf)

### Abstract

As an emerging primitive, Registered Functional Encryption (RFE) eliminates t=
he key-escrow issue that threatens numerous works for functional encryption, =
by replacing the trusted authority with a transparent key curator and allowin=
g each user to sample their decryption keys locally. In this work, we present=
 a new black-box approach to construct RFE for all polynomial-sized circuits.=
 It considers adaptive simulation-based security in the bounded collusion mod=
el (Gorbunov et al. - CRYPTO'12), where the security can be ensured only if t=
here are no more than Q >=3D 1 corrupted users and $Q$ is fixed at the setup =
phase. Unlike earlier works, we do not employ unpractical Indistinguishabilit=
y Obfuscation (iO). Conversely, it can be extended to support unbounded users=
, which is previously only known from iO.

Technically, our general compiler exploits garbled circuits and a novel varia=
nt of slotted Registered Broadcast Encryption (RBE), namely global slotted RB=
E. This primitive is similar to slotted RBE, but needs optimally compact publ=
ic parameters and ciphertext, so as to satisfy the efficiency requirement of =
the resulting RFE. Then we present two concrete global slotted RBE from pairi=
ngs and lattices, respectively. With proposed compiler, we hence obtain two b=
ounded collusion-resistant RFE schemes. Here, the first scheme relies on k-Li=
n assumption, while the second one supports unbounded users under LWE and eva=
sive LWE assumptions.



## 2024/1593

* Title: Stateful Communication with Malicious Parties
* Authors: Chen-Da Liu-Zhang, Christopher Portmann, Guilherme Rito
* [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1593)
* [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1593.pdf)

### Abstract

Cryptography's most common use is secure communication---e.g. Alice can use e=
ncryption to hide the contents of the messages she sends to Bob (confidential=
ity) and can use signatures to assure Bob she sent these messages (authentici=
ty). While one typically considers stateless security guarantees---for exampl=
e a channel that Alice can use to send messages securely to Bob---one can als=
o consider stateful ones---e.g. an interactive conversation between Alice, Bo=
b and their friends where participation is dynamic: new parties can join the =
conversation and existing ones can leave. A natural application of such state=
ful guarantees are messengers.

We introduce a modular abstraction for stateful group communication, called C=
hat Sessions, which captures security guarantees that are achievable in fully=
 asynchronous settings when one makes no party-honesty assumptions: anyone (i=
ncluding group members themselves) can be fully dishonest. Our abstraction is=
 parameterized by (and enforces) a permissions policy that defines what opera=
tions parties have the right to perform in a given chat state. We show how to=
 construct, use and extend Chat Sessions.

Our construction is fully decentralized (in particular, it need not a deliver=
y service), does not incur additional interaction between chat participants (=
other than what is inherent from chat operations like sending a message) and =
liveness depends solely on messages being delivered.

A key feature of Chat Sessions is modularity: we extend Chat Sessions to capt=
ure authenticity, confidentiality, anonymity and off-the-record, and show our=
 construction provides these guarantees if the underlying communication chann=
els do too. We complement this by proving Maurer et al.'s Multi-Designated Re=
ceiver Public Key Encryption scheme (Eurocrypt '22) constructs matching commu=
nication channels (i.e. with all these guarantees).

We use Chat Sessions to construct UatChat: a simple and equally modular messa=
ging application. Since UatChat preserves each of the guarantees mentioned ab=
ove, this means we give the first fully Off-The-Record messaging application:=
 parties can plausibly deny not only having sent any messages but even of bei=
ng aware of a chat's existence.



## 2025/191

* Title: Adaptive Distributional Security: A Framework for Input-Adaptive Cry=
ptography
* Authors: Cruz Barnum, David Heath
* [Permalink](https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/191)
* [Download](https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/191.pdf)

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