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Ravi Agrawal interviewing Elbridge Colby, a former Pentagon policymaker.

https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/07/31/elbridge-colby-trump-foreign-policy-military-china/?tpcc=recirc_insider091023

"Ravi Agrawal: You have popularized the argument that there is a
trade-off between aiding Ukraine and deterring China. And you’ve said
quite clearly that Asia is more important than Europe when it comes to
U.S. national security. Why?

Elbridge Colby: I approach this from the standpoint of a colloquial
realism, a pragmatic realism, focused on Americans’ practical interests.
Traditional American foreign policy was basically designed to prevent
potentially hostile states from dominating the most important market
area, the basis for a great power to use that strength to undermine our
way of life. And if you look at it that way, there’s really no question
that Asia is the most important area. I think it’s about half of the
global population, and it’s where growth is concentrated.

RA: Yes, but if the White House makes clear to European leaders that it
is less important, doesn’t that hurt America’s most important alliances?
Don’t alliances matter?

EC: Alliances absolutely do matter. My view is alliances are so
important that we actually expect people to do their part.

Stepping back, the implicit understanding, if I may be forgiven, behind
what you’re saying is that alliances are feel-good operations. Biden
describes them as kind of sacred. I don’t think that’s how we should
look at alliances. I think we should look at them as, frankly, in a
business-like way, that they’re supposed to serve both sides’ interests.
Obviously, they have those very deep connections. But at the end of the
day, these alliances are meant to do something for us and for others.

If people are not doing that, which has been the case, for instance, in
Germany, Japan, and Taiwan, then there really needs to be consequences
for that. Otherwise, we’re actually not taking alliances seriously. I do
take alliances seriously. And so if Trump-proofing NATO leads European
countries and Canada to actually spend more and meet their defense
commitments there, that’s actually the thing they should be doing
anyway. So that’s good for them.

RA: But if the White House says Asia is more important, Moscow might get
the signal that it can be more aggressive in policies toward Europe. The
critique of what you’re saying is that words and signals matter in
diplomacy.

EC: Sure, but actions matter more. And at the end of the day, we need to
reconcile actions with reality and the words implicit behind what you’re
saying. For many years, very high American officials of both political
parties were politely ignored when they plaintively and nicely made
arguments to the Europeans and others. In my view, if we’re not
communicating a costly signal that this is very serious and there are
real dangers, that’s actually not being good allies.
...
RA: But two things can be true at the same time. So, America can ask
Europe to do a lot more, and it seems like it is. But second, America
can continue to support Europe. Because with the policy you’re
describing and suggesting, what if Ukraine falls?

EC: My own view is that we should remain in NATO and the European pillar
should take lead responsibility. So far our conversation has been
focusing on Europe, which is a symptom of the problem that we face in
the foreign-policy debate. Europe is a fraction of Asia, and Russia is a
10th the size of China [in population]. Why are we spending all this
time dealing with Europe? Of course, I don’t want to abandon Europe, but
I’m dealing with the reality that we’re facing. There simply are
constraints. China is the largest state we have dealt with. It’s the
first time that we are not by far the largest state in the international
system for about 150 years. So that, just by necessity, imposes
constraint."