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From: Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org>
Newsgroups: sci.logic,comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Correcting the AI hallucination of LLM systems
Date: Sat, 7 Sep 2024 09:18:24 -0400
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On 9/7/24 8:49 AM, olcott wrote:
> On 9/6/2024 6:41 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>> On 9/6/24 8:24 AM, olcott wrote:
>>> On 9/6/2024 6:43 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>> On 2024-09-03 12:49:11 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>
>>>>> On 9/3/2024 5:44 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>>>> On 2024-09-02 12:24:38 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On 9/2/2024 3:29 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 2024-09-01 12:56:16 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> On 8/31/2024 10:04 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> *I just fixed the loophole of the Gettier cases*
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> knowledge is a justified true belief such that the
>>>>>>>>>> justification is sufficient reason to accept the
>>>>>>>>>> truth of the belief.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> With a Justified true belief, in the Gettier cases
>>>>>>>>> the observer does not know enough to know its true
>>>>>>>>> yet it remains stipulated to be true.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> My original correction to this was a JTB such that the
>>>>>>>>> justification necessitates the truth of the belief.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> With a [Sufficiently Justified belief], it is stipulated
>>>>>>>>> that the observer does have a sufficient reason to accept
>>>>>>>>> the truth of the belief.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> What could be a sufficient reason? Every justification of every
>>>>>>>> belief involves other belifs that could be false.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> For the justification to be sufficient the consequence of
>>>>>>> the belief must be semantically entailed by its justification.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> If the belief is about something real then its justification
>>>>>> involves claims about something real. Nothing real is certain.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I don't think that is correct.
>>>>> My left hand exists right now even if it is
>>>>> a mere figment of my own imagination and five
>>>>> minutes ago never existed.
>>>>
>>>> As I don't know and can't (at least now) verify whether your left
>>>> hand exists or ever existed I can't regard that as a counter-
>>>> example.
>>>>
>>>>>> If the belief is not about something real then it is not clear
>>>>>> whether it is correct to call it "belief".
>>>>>
>>>>> *An axiomatic chain of inference based on this*
>>>>> By the theory of simple types I mean the doctrine which says
>>>>> that the objects of thought (or, in another interpretation,
>>>>> the symbolic expressions) are divided into types, namely:
>>>>> individuals, properties of individuals, relations between
>>>>> individuals, properties of such relations, etc.
>>>>>
>>>>> ...sentences of the form: " a has the property φ ", " b bears
>>>>> the relation R to c ", etc. are meaningless, if a, b, c, R, φ
>>>>> are not of types fitting together.
>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_type_theory#G%C3%B6del_1944
>>>>
>>>> The concepts of knowledge and truth are applicable to the knowledge
>>>> whether that is what certain peple meant when using those words.
>>>> Whether or to what extent that theory can be said to be true is
>>>> another problem.
>>>>
>>>
>>> The fundamental architectural overview of all Prolog implementations
>>> is the same True(x) means X is derived by applying Rules (AKA truth 
>>> preserving operations) to Facts.
>>
>> But Prolog can't even handle full first order logic, only basic 
>> propositions. The way you keep falling back to it shows that your 
>> understanding of Logic is very limited.
> 
> The architecture Prolog implementations can be extended to
> an arbitrary number of simultaneous orders of logic, like
> type theory or a knowledge ontology inheritance hierarchy.
> 
> The only thing that were are taking from Prolog is the notion of
> Facts and Rules and true means expression X is only true on L when
> X is derived from Facts in L by applying Rules.
> 
> Facts apply to formal language and natural language and are
> stipulated to be true. Here is what Haskell Curry calls them:
> "an elementary theorem is an elementary statement which is true."
> https://www.liarparadox.org/Haskell_Curry_45.pdf
> 
> Rules apply to natural language and are a sequence of truth
> preserving operations.
> 
>>>
>>> That is the way that all expressions X of language L are determined
>>> to be true in L on the basis of the connection from X in L by truth 
>>> preserving operations to the semantic meaning of X in L.
>>
>> Right, but the connection might be infinite in length.
>>
> 
> That would not be true in L.
> 

Of course it would be, that is the DEFINITION.

This seems to be a core blind spot to yourself, which just shows your 
ignorance.

Infinite chains establishing true is a needed part to allow unrestricted 
universal qualification.

The truth of the statement "For all n in the Natural Numbers, f(n) > 0", 
might only be able to be shown to be true by examining f(n) at every 
Natural Number, all infinite number of them, but such a statement, by 
the rules of Mathematics, must either be True or False.

> ?- LP = not(true(LP)).
> LP = not(true(LP)).
> ?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
> false. // indicates infinite evaluation sequence

Which is just a non-sequitur, which seems to be the natural form of your 
logic.

> 
>>>
>>> {Linguistic truth} is the philosophical foundation of truth
>>> in math and logic, AKA relations between finite strings.
>>>
>>
>> Which you can't seem to explain how it differs from the classical 
>> semantic truth created by the (possibly infinite) chain of logical 
>> steps from the fundamental truth-makers of the system.
> 
> The key difference is that all expressions that were
> previously undecidable become rejected as not truth-bearers
> in L. The key benefit of this is that Tarski Undefinability
> is refuted enabling LLM systems to be able to detect their
> own falsehoods thus getting rid of AI hallucination.

You don't seem to understand what you are saying, to paraphrase a famous 
quote, your lips are flapping, but nothing intelligent is coming out.

Trying to restrict "truth" to just what is knowable doesn't make your 
system more powerful, but extremely less.

> 
> We certainly can never have reliable artificial general
> intelligence (AGI) when an AI system has no way to tell a
> lie from the truth.
> 

So? If *WE* can't alway tell if a statement is true or not, because we 
are missing data about it, why do you think an AI could determine it?