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From: john larkin <jl@650pot.com>
Newsgroups: sci.electronics.design
Subject: Re: Challenger
Date: Mon, 10 Jun 2024 22:49:56 -0700
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On Tue, 11 Jun 2024 01:43:37 -0400, bitrex <user@example.net> wrote:

>On 6/10/2024 11:11 PM, Phil Hobbs wrote:
>
>>> " In retelling how the decision unfolded through the eyes of the
>>> managers and the engineers, Vaughan uncovers an incremental descent into
>>> poor judgment, supported by a culture of high-risk technology. She
>>> reveals how and why NASA insiders, when repeatedly faced with evidence
>>> that something was wrong, normalized the deviance so that it became
>>> acceptable to them."
>>>
>>> I guess I'm not grasping from the summary of the Vaughan book how its
>>> conclusions greatly differ from the conclusions of Feynman et al.
>> 
>> Maybe if you read the book, you’ll understand. The conclusions could hardly
>> be more different, given the basic facts of the case.  Boisjoly et al. and
>> the Rogers commission are only a fraction of the story.
>> 
>> Cheers
>> 
>> Phil Hobbs
>>
>
>I was able to at least find a summary, 620 pages about a disaster I'm 
>barely old enough to remember is a tall ask at this time.
>
><https://web.mit.edu/esd.83/www/notebook/The%20Challenger%20Launch%20Decision_1.pdf>
>
>I think I somewhat understand the thrust of the argument, that nobody in 
>management really believed themselves to be taking risks of the kind the 
>public later perceived them to have been taking.
>
>There was no particular person who was actively like "Welp there's 
>probably a decent chance the crew won't make it but we're going anyway 
>because if we don't <some easily enumerable bad thing will happen>", the 
>consequences to everyone involved were far too high to ever be actively 
>cavalier.
>
>They had their processes and they followed the processes. Yeah Thiokol 
>engineers balked when asked about this particular launch but I expect 
>they balked relatively regularly it's no skin off their ass to say "no 
>go", but at the end of the day as a NASA-person your job is to fire 
>rockets with people on them from time to time, either have a manned 
>space program or don't. Can always find reasons not to launch.

The Thiokol engineers said not to launch below 56 degrees F, or the
SRB o-rings wouldn't seal. The temp was 19 that morning.