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From: "Edward Rawde" <invalid@invalid.invalid>
Newsgroups: sci.electronics.design
Subject: Re: Re:Predictive failures
Date: Wed, 17 Apr 2024 01:39:51 -0400
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"Don Y" <blockedofcourse@foo.invalid> wrote in message 
news:uvnlr6$1e3fi$1@dont-email.me...
> On 4/16/2024 9:21 PM, Edward Rawde wrote:
>>> The internal network isn't routed.  So, the only machines to worry about
>>> are
>>> this one (used only for email/news/web) and a laptop that is only used
>>> for ecommerce.
>>
>> My LAN is more like a small/medium size business with all workstations,
>> servers and devices behind a firewall and able to communicate both with 
>> each
>> other and online as necessary.
>
> I have 72 drops in the office and 240 throughout the rest of the house
> (though the vast majority of those are for dedicated "appliances")...
> about 2.5 miles of CAT5.

Must be a big house.

>
>...
>>> I have an out-facing server that operates in stealth mode and won't 
>>> appear
>>> on probes (only used to source my work to colleagues).  The goal is not 
>>> to
>>> look "interesting".
>>
>> Not sure what you mean by that.
>> Given what gets thrown at my firewall I think you could maybe look more
>> interesting than you think.
>
> Nothing on my side "answers" connection attempts.  To the rest of the 
> world,
> it looks like a cable dangling in air...

You could ping me if you knew my IP address.

>
>>> The structure of the house's fabric allows me to treat any individual
>>> node as being directly connected to the ISP while isolating the
>>> rest of the nodes.  I.e., if you bring a laptop loaded with malware into
>>> the house, you can't infect anything (or even know that there are other
>>> hosts, here); it's as if you had a dedicated connection to the Internet
>>> with no other devices "nearby".
>>
>> I wouldn't bother. I'd just not connect it to wifi or wired if I thought
>> there was a risk.

What I mean by that is I'd clean it without it being connected.
The Avira boot CD used to be useful but I forget how many years ago.

>
> So, you'd have to *police* all such connections.  What do you do with 
> hundreds
> of drops on a factory floor?  Or, scattered throughout a business?  Can
> you prevent any "foreign" devices from being connected -- even if IN PLACE 
> OF
> a legitimate device?  (after all, it is a trivial matter to unplug a 
> network
> cable from one "approved" PC and plug it into a "foreign import")

Devices on a LAN should be secure just like Internet facing devices.

>
>> It's been a while since I had to clean a malware infested PC.
>
> My current project relies heavily on internetworking for interprocessor
> communication.  So, has to be designed to tolerate (and survive) a
> hostile actor being directly connected TO that fabric -- because that
> is a likely occurrence, "in the wild".
>
> Imagine someone being able to open your PC and alter the internals...
> and be expected to continue to operate as if this had not occurred!
>