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From: Mikko <mikko.levanto@iki.fi>
Newsgroups: sci.logic
Subject: Re: True on the basis of meaning
Date: Thu, 16 May 2024 11:44:52 +0300
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On 2024-05-15 14:27:40 +0000, olcott said:

> On 5/15/2024 3:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
>> On 2024-05-14 14:42:36 +0000, olcott said:
>> 
>>> On 5/14/2024 4:08 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>> On 2024-05-13 14:48:21 +0000, olcott said:
>>>> 
>>>>> On 5/13/2024 4:23 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>>>> On 2024-05-12 18:36:22 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> On 5/12/2024 1:22 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 5/12/24 2:06 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>> On 5/12/2024 12:52 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> On 5/12/24 1:19 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/12/2024 10:33 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2024-05-12 14:22:25 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/12/2024 2:42 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2024-05-11 04:27:03 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/10/2024 10:49 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/10/24 11:35 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/10/2024 10:16 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 5/10/24 10:36 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The entire body of expressions that are {true on the basis of their
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning} involves nothing more or less than stipulated relations between
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> finite strings.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> You do know that what you are describing when applied to Formal Systems 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> are the axioms of the system and the most primitively provable theorems.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> YES and there are axioms that comprise the verbal model of the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> actual world, thus Quine was wrong.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> You don't understand what Quite was talking about,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I don't need to know anything about what he was talking about
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> except that he disagreed with {true on the basis or meaning}.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I don't care or need to know how he got to an incorrect answer.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> You don't seem to understand what "Formal Logic" actually means.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Ultimately it is anchored in stipulated relations between finite
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> strings (AKA axioms) and expressions derived from applying truth
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> preserving operations to these axioms.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Which you don't seem to understand what that means.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I understand this much more deeply than you do.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> In and about formal logic there is no valid deep understanding. Only
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a shallow understanding can be valid.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>>> It turns out that ALL {true on the basis of meaning} that includes
>>>>>>>>>>>>> ALL of logic and math has its entire foundation in relations between
>>>>>>>>>>>>> finite strings. Some are stipulated to be true (axioms) and some
>>>>>>>>>>>>> are derived by applying truth preserving operations to these axioms.
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>>> Usually the word "true" is not used when talking about uninterpreted
>>>>>>>>>>>> formal systems. Axioms and what can be inferred from axioms are called
>>>>>>>>>>>> "theorems". Theorems can be true in some interpretations and false in
>>>>>>>>>>>> another. If the system is incosistent then there is no interpretation
>>>>>>>>>>>> where all axioms are true.
>>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> I am not talking about how these things are usually spoken of. I am
>>>>>>>>>>> talking about my unique contribution to the actual philosophical
>>>>>>>>>>> foundation of {true on the basis of meaning}.
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> Which means you need to be VERY clear about what you claim to be 
>>>>>>>>>> "usually spoken of" and what is your unique contribution.
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> You then need to show how your contribution isn't in conflict with the 
>>>>>>>>>> classical parts, but follows within its definitions.
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> If you want to say that something in the classical theory is not 
>>>>>>>>>> actually true, then you need to show how removing that piece doesn't 
>>>>>>>>>> affect the system. This seems to be a weak point of yours, you think 
>>>>>>>>>> you can change a system, and not show that the system can still exist 
>>>>>>>>>> as it was.
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> This is entirely comprised of relations between finite strings:
>>>>>>>>>>> some of which are stipulated to have the semantic value of Boolean
>>>>>>>>>>> true, and others derived from applying truth preserving operations
>>>>>>>>>>> to these finite string.
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>>> This is approximately equivalent to proofs from axioms. It is not
>>>>>>>>>>> exactly the same thing because an infinite sequence of inference
>>>>>>>>>>> steps may sometimes be required. It is also not exactly the same
>>>>>>>>>>> because some proofs are not restricted to truth preserving operations.
>>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> So, what effect does that difference have?
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>>> You seem here to accept that some truths are based on an infinite 
>>>>>>>>>> sequence of operations, while you admit that proofs are finite 
>>>>>>>>>> sequences, but it seems you still assert that all truths must be 
>>>>>>>>>> provable.
>>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> I did not use the term "provable" or "proofs" these only apply to
>>>>>>>>> finite sequences. {derived from applying truth preserving operations}
>>>>>>>>> can involve infinite sequences.
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> But if true can come out of an infinite sequences, and some need such 
>>>>>>>> an infinite sequence, but proof requires a finite sequence, that shows 
>>>>>>>> that there will exists some statements are true, but not provable.
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> ...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar 
>>>>>>>>> undecidability proof...(Gödel 1931:43-44)
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> When we look at the way that {true on the basis of meaning}
>>>>>>>>> actually works, then all epistemological antinomies are simply untrue.
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> And Godel would agree to that. You just don't understand what that line 
>>>>>>>> 14 means.
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> It can be proven in a finite sequence of steps that
>>>>>>> epistemological antinomies are simply untrue.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> And also that every claim from which an epistemological antinomy could
>>>>>> be proven must be untrue.
>>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> There are no sequence of truth preserving operations from expressions 
>>>>> that have been stipulated to be true that derive X or ~X when X is an
>>>>> epistemological antinomy, thus X is rejected as not a truth-bearer.
>>>> 
>>>> That depends on stipulations. If someone stipulates enough then
>>>> it is possible to derive an epistemological antimomy.
>>>> 
>>> 
>>> An accurate model of all of the general knowledge of the actual world.
>>> Expressions that are stipulated to be true must actually be true.
>> 
>> Does that mean that everything uncertain is excluded from "general
>> knowledge of the actual world"? If so, then very little is left.
>> 
> 
> My purpose is to show a simple easy way to reject epistemological
> antinomies such as the Liar Paradox from forming the basis for any
> formal proof.

How is an accureate model of all general knowledge of the actual world
relevant to that?

-- 
Mikko