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From: olcott <polcott333@gmail.com>
Newsgroups: comp.theory
Subject: Re: I just fixed the loophole of the Gettier cases with mt new notion
 of {linguistic truth}
Date: Fri, 6 Sep 2024 07:10:10 -0500
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On 9/6/2024 6:34 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
> On 9/5/24 11:47 PM, olcott wrote:
>> On 9/5/2024 9:35 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>> On 9/5/24 8:58 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 9/5/2024 2:20 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>>> On 2024-09-03 13:03:51 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>>
>>>>>> On 9/3/2024 3:39 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>>>>> On 2024-09-02 13:33:36 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On 9/1/2024 5:58 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>>>>>>> On 2024-09-01 03:04:43 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> *I just fixed the loophole of the Gettier cases*
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> knowledge is a justified true belief such that the
>>>>>>>>>> justification is sufficient reason to accept the
>>>>>>>>>> truth of the belief.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> The remaining loophole is the lack of an exact definition
>>>>>>>>> of "sufficient reason".
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Ultimately sufficient reason is correct semantic
>>>>>>>> entailment from verified facts.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The problem is "verified" facts: what is sufficient verification?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Stipulated to be true is always sufficient:
>>>>>> Cats are a know if animal.
>>>>>
>>>>> Insufficient for practtical purposes. You may stipulate that
>>>>> nitroglycerine is not poison but it can kill you anyway.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> The point is that <is> the way the linguistic truth actually works.
>>>> Millions of these stipulated relations in a knowledge hierarchy
>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology_(information_science)
>>>> comprise human knowledge expressed in language.
>>>>
>>>> Stipulated relations are like the Prolog Facts. Truth preserving
>>>> operations are like the Prolog Rules. Anything unprovable by
>>>> Facts and Rules in the system is untrue in the system.
>>>>
>>>> Self-contradictory expressions are rejected as not truth bearers
>>>> instead of categorized as undecidable propositions.
>>>
>>> Which just shows you don't even understand the problem that Gettier 
>>> was pointing out. It isn't "bad logic", it is knowing you have a 
>>> correct interpretation of your observations.
>>>
>>> Your problem is it is impossible to determine "sufficient verification".
>>>
>>
>> It was a justified true belief (all three were stipulated)
>> except the justification had a loophole allowing it to be
>> insufficient justification under Gettier.
> 
> And the problem is you can't just "define away" that insufficiency.
> 
> Your problem is you just don't know enough to see the problem, and thus 
> assume there isn't one, which is EXACTLY the sort of thing Gettier was 
> pointing out. One of the examples was deducing there was a fire because 
> they saw smoke, but the "smoke" was just a cloud of insects, and not 
> smoke, attracted to the fire that wasn't creating smoke.
> 
> The justification was incorrect, so should we call that knowledge of 
> fire, and if someone can be convinced they "know" something, when they 
> don't, were they correct in calling it "knowledge", and if we can't 
> actually know that we know something, do we even know it, even if it 
> might be true?
> 
>>
>> Just like it is stipulated to be true, it is now stipulated
>> to be "sufficient justification". The strongest justification
>> is a necessary consequence from stipulated truths.
> 
> No, you are just showing your ignorance for the words or what the 
> problem is.
> 
> It is not "stipulated" that knowledge is true, it is a definitional 
> requirement. And the problem that Gettier was talking about is that we 
> can't be certain our interpretation of our observation is correct, so we 
> can't be sure our reaso
> 
>>
>> *The simplest example of this is the syllogism*
>> Major premise: All humans are mortal.
>> Minor premise: All Greeks are humans.
>> Conclusion/Consequent: All Greeks are mortal.
>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Syllogism#Basic_structure
> 
> Which, since it has no "observations" in it, doesn't talk about the 
> issue here.
> 

It provides a concrete example of sufficient justification thus
conclusively proving the sufficient justification exists.

>>
>> Other justifications would be less certain
>> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/induction-problem/
>>
> 
> Which seems to mean that you are just trying to define away the problem 
> by ignoring it. 

A justified true belief is impossibly false because it is stipulated
to only apply to true beliefs.

> Gettier is talking about knowledge that comes from 
> observations, and the fact that it seems impossible to determine if we 
> are "correctly interpreting" or observations of the world.
> 

Suppose that Smith and Jones have applied for a certain job.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem#Case_I
Sufficient evidence that Smith got the job would be the boss
tells Smith he got the job.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem#Case_II
Smith knows that Brown really is in Barcelona on the
sufficient basis that Smith travels to Barcelona and
sees Brown in Barcelona.

> Thus, the question of can we actually have empirical knowledge?
> 

We can look at out left hand and although it looks feels
and acts like a left hand it is really a fifteen story
office building?

> You are just showing your short sightedness by pontificating about 
> things you do not understand.


-- 
Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer