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From: Mikko <mikko.levanto@iki.fi>
Newsgroups: sci.logic
Subject: Re: I just fixed the loophole of the Gettier cases
Date: Sat, 7 Sep 2024 11:46:37 +0300
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On 2024-09-06 23:41:16 +0000, Richard Damon said:

> On 9/6/24 8:24 AM, olcott wrote:
>> On 9/6/2024 6:43 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>> On 2024-09-03 12:49:11 +0000, olcott said:
>>> 
>>>> On 9/3/2024 5:44 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>>> On 2024-09-02 12:24:38 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>> 
>>>>>> On 9/2/2024 3:29 AM, Mikko wrote:
>>>>>>> On 2024-09-01 12:56:16 +0000, olcott said:
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> On 8/31/2024 10:04 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>> *I just fixed the loophole of the Gettier cases*
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> knowledge is a justified true belief such that the
>>>>>>>>> justification is sufficient reason to accept the
>>>>>>>>> truth of the belief.
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem
>>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> With a Justified true belief, in the Gettier cases
>>>>>>>> the observer does not know enough to know its true
>>>>>>>> yet it remains stipulated to be true.
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> My original correction to this was a JTB such that the
>>>>>>>> justification necessitates the truth of the belief.
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> With a [Sufficiently Justified belief], it is stipulated
>>>>>>>> that the observer does have a sufficient reason to accept
>>>>>>>> the truth of the belief.
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> What could be a sufficient reason? Every justification of every
>>>>>>> belief involves other belifs that could be false.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> For the justification to be sufficient the consequence of
>>>>>> the belief must be semantically entailed by its justification.
>>>>> 
>>>>> If the belief is about something real then its justification
>>>>> involves claims about something real. Nothing real is certain.
>>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> I don't think that is correct.
>>>> My left hand exists right now even if it is
>>>> a mere figment of my own imagination and five
>>>> minutes ago never existed.
>>> 
>>> As I don't know and can't (at least now) verify whether your left
>>> hand exists or ever existed I can't regard that as a counter-
>>> example.
>>> 
>>>>> If the belief is not about something real then it is not clear
>>>>> whether it is correct to call it "belief".
>>>> 
>>>> *An axiomatic chain of inference based on this*
>>>> By the theory of simple types I mean the doctrine which says
>>>> that the objects of thought (or, in another interpretation,
>>>> the symbolic expressions) are divided into types, namely:
>>>> individuals, properties of individuals, relations between
>>>> individuals, properties of such relations, etc.
>>>> 
>>>> ...sentences of the form: " a has the property φ ", " b bears
>>>> the relation R to c ", etc. are meaningless, if a, b, c, R, φ
>>>> are not of types fitting together.
>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_type_theory#G%C3%B6del_1944
>>> 
>>> The concepts of knowledge and truth are applicable to the knowledge
>>> whether that is what certain peple meant when using those words.
>>> Whether or to what extent that theory can be said to be true is
>>> another problem.
>>> 
>> 
>> The fundamental architectural overview of all Prolog implementations
>> is the same True(x) means X is derived by applying Rules (AKA truth 
>> preserving operations) to Facts.
> 
> But Prolog can't even handle full first order logic, only basic propositions.

The logic behind Prolog is restricted enough that incompleteness cannot
be differentiated from consistency. It seems that Olcott wants a logic
with that impossibility.

-- 
Mikko