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Path: ...!eternal-september.org!feeder3.eternal-september.org!news.eternal-september.org!.POSTED!not-for-mail From: olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> Newsgroups: sci.logic,comp.ai.philosophy Subject: Correcting the AI hallucination of LLM systems Date: Sat, 7 Sep 2024 07:49:02 -0500 Organization: A noiseless patient Spider Lines: 133 Message-ID: <vbhi3u$1c7u5$1@dont-email.me> References: <vb0lj5$1c1kh$1@dont-email.me> <vb1o9g$1g7lq$1@dont-email.me> <vb3t1j$22k1l$1@dont-email.me> <vb4aq6$2r7ok$1@dont-email.me> <vb6p9v$3aebo$1@dont-email.me> <vb70k8$3b4ub$2@dont-email.me> <vbepsc$q8v6$1@dont-email.me> <vbes94$punj$12@dont-email.me> <24f85bcd40f57685aab93d45f15501178e526d0f@i2pn2.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Injection-Date: Sat, 07 Sep 2024 14:49:03 +0200 (CEST) Injection-Info: dont-email.me; posting-host="fc36cd944b9fa7fa30157002795d809b"; logging-data="1449925"; mail-complaints-to="abuse@eternal-september.org"; posting-account="U2FsdGVkX19Qxl8ZZ69fLOnppQJ922uP" User-Agent: Mozilla Thunderbird Cancel-Lock: sha1:j9RC2Z+OXXCWh0x4e1h1+4R4k04= Content-Language: en-US In-Reply-To: <24f85bcd40f57685aab93d45f15501178e526d0f@i2pn2.org> Bytes: 6718 On 9/6/2024 6:41 PM, Richard Damon wrote: > On 9/6/24 8:24 AM, olcott wrote: >> On 9/6/2024 6:43 AM, Mikko wrote: >>> On 2024-09-03 12:49:11 +0000, olcott said: >>> >>>> On 9/3/2024 5:44 AM, Mikko wrote: >>>>> On 2024-09-02 12:24:38 +0000, olcott said: >>>>> >>>>>> On 9/2/2024 3:29 AM, Mikko wrote: >>>>>>> On 2024-09-01 12:56:16 +0000, olcott said: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On 8/31/2024 10:04 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>> *I just fixed the loophole of the Gettier cases* >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> knowledge is a justified true belief such that the >>>>>>>>> justification is sufficient reason to accept the >>>>>>>>> truth of the belief. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gettier_problem >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> With a Justified true belief, in the Gettier cases >>>>>>>> the observer does not know enough to know its true >>>>>>>> yet it remains stipulated to be true. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> My original correction to this was a JTB such that the >>>>>>>> justification necessitates the truth of the belief. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> With a [Sufficiently Justified belief], it is stipulated >>>>>>>> that the observer does have a sufficient reason to accept >>>>>>>> the truth of the belief. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> What could be a sufficient reason? Every justification of every >>>>>>> belief involves other belifs that could be false. >>>>>> >>>>>> For the justification to be sufficient the consequence of >>>>>> the belief must be semantically entailed by its justification. >>>>> >>>>> If the belief is about something real then its justification >>>>> involves claims about something real. Nothing real is certain. >>>>> >>>> >>>> I don't think that is correct. >>>> My left hand exists right now even if it is >>>> a mere figment of my own imagination and five >>>> minutes ago never existed. >>> >>> As I don't know and can't (at least now) verify whether your left >>> hand exists or ever existed I can't regard that as a counter- >>> example. >>> >>>>> If the belief is not about something real then it is not clear >>>>> whether it is correct to call it "belief". >>>> >>>> *An axiomatic chain of inference based on this* >>>> By the theory of simple types I mean the doctrine which says >>>> that the objects of thought (or, in another interpretation, >>>> the symbolic expressions) are divided into types, namely: >>>> individuals, properties of individuals, relations between >>>> individuals, properties of such relations, etc. >>>> >>>> ...sentences of the form: " a has the property φ ", " b bears >>>> the relation R to c ", etc. are meaningless, if a, b, c, R, φ >>>> are not of types fitting together. >>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_type_theory#G%C3%B6del_1944 >>> >>> The concepts of knowledge and truth are applicable to the knowledge >>> whether that is what certain peple meant when using those words. >>> Whether or to what extent that theory can be said to be true is >>> another problem. >>> >> >> The fundamental architectural overview of all Prolog implementations >> is the same True(x) means X is derived by applying Rules (AKA truth >> preserving operations) to Facts. > > But Prolog can't even handle full first order logic, only basic > propositions. The way you keep falling back to it shows that your > understanding of Logic is very limited. The architecture Prolog implementations can be extended to an arbitrary number of simultaneous orders of logic, like type theory or a knowledge ontology inheritance hierarchy. The only thing that were are taking from Prolog is the notion of Facts and Rules and true means expression X is only true on L when X is derived from Facts in L by applying Rules. Facts apply to formal language and natural language and are stipulated to be true. Here is what Haskell Curry calls them: "an elementary theorem is an elementary statement which is true." https://www.liarparadox.org/Haskell_Curry_45.pdf Rules apply to natural language and are a sequence of truth preserving operations. >> >> That is the way that all expressions X of language L are determined >> to be true in L on the basis of the connection from X in L by truth >> preserving operations to the semantic meaning of X in L. > > Right, but the connection might be infinite in length. > That would not be true in L. ?- LP = not(true(LP)). LP = not(true(LP)). ?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))). false. // indicates infinite evaluation sequence >> >> {Linguistic truth} is the philosophical foundation of truth >> in math and logic, AKA relations between finite strings. >> > > Which you can't seem to explain how it differs from the classical > semantic truth created by the (possibly infinite) chain of logical steps > from the fundamental truth-makers of the system. The key difference is that all expressions that were previously undecidable become rejected as not truth-bearers in L. The key benefit of this is that Tarski Undefinability is refuted enabling LLM systems to be able to detect their own falsehoods thus getting rid of AI hallucination. We certainly can never have reliable artificial general intelligence (AGI) when an AI system has no way to tell a lie from the truth. -- Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer