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Path: ...!2.eu.feeder.erje.net!feeder.erje.net!feeds.news.ox.ac.uk!news.ox.ac.uk!nntp-feed.chiark.greenend.org.uk!ewrotcd!news.eyrie.org!beagle.ediacara.org!.POSTED.beagle.ediacara.org!not-for-mail From: RonO <rokimoto557@gmail.com> Newsgroups: talk.origins Subject: Re: H5N1 genotype D1.1 Date: Sat, 28 Dec 2024 11:28:03 -0600 Organization: A noiseless patient Spider Lines: 251 Sender: to%beagle.ediacara.org Approved: moderator@beagle.ediacara.org Message-ID: <vkpcf1$eam1$1@dont-email.me> References: <vkn6ja$3qt4b$1@dont-email.me> <U6OdnRXCV-Eb3fL6nZ2dnZfqnPednZ2d@giganews.com> <vkp0th$bndj$1@dont-email.me> Reply-To: rokimoto557@gmail.com MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Injection-Info: beagle.ediacara.org; posting-host="beagle.ediacara.org:3.132.105.89"; logging-data="82439"; mail-complaints-to="usenet@beagle.ediacara.org" User-Agent: Mozilla Thunderbird To: talk-origins@moderators.isc.org Cancel-Lock: sha1:i3sKNZKMCD8AFHsRXF/y2UOt+RE= Return-Path: <news@eternal-september.org> X-Original-To: talk-origins@ediacara.org Delivered-To: talk-origins@ediacara.org id 0264D229782; Sat, 28 Dec 2024 12:28:16 -0500 (EST) by beagle.ediacara.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 9CAE1229765 for <talk-origins@ediacara.org>; Sat, 28 Dec 2024 12:28:13 -0500 (EST) by pi-dach.dorfdsl.de (8.18.1/8.18.1/Debian-6~bpo12+1) with ESMTPS id 4BSHS6CW4111818 (version=TLSv1.3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT) for <talk-origins@moderators.isc.org>; Sat, 28 Dec 2024 18:28:07 +0100 (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature ECDSA (P-256) server-digest SHA256) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.eternal-september.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 95C235FD4B for <talk-origins@moderators.isc.org>; Sat, 28 Dec 2024 17:28:03 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: name/95C235FD4B; dmarc=fail (p=none dis=none) header.from=gmail.com id 13DD3DC01A9; Sat, 28 Dec 2024 18:28:03 +0100 (CET) X-Injection-Date: Sat, 28 Dec 2024 18:28:02 +0100 (CET) Content-Language: en-US In-Reply-To: <vkp0th$bndj$1@dont-email.me> X-Auth-Sender: U2FsdGVkX19Mzu2d4s09xfK2/FE9WEnsyAiz4ap/ZzQ= FREEMAIL_FORGED_REPLYTO,FREEMAIL_REPLYTO_END_DIGIT, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,NML_ADSP_CUSTOM_MED,SPF_HELO_NONE, SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_IN_WELCOMELIST,USER_IN_WHITELIST autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.6 smtp.eternal-september.org Bytes: 17434 On 12/28/2024 8:10 AM, RonO wrote: > On 12/27/2024 6:04 PM, *Hemidactylus* wrote: >> RonO <rokimoto557@gmail.com> wrote: >>> https://www.cidrap.umn.edu/avian-influenza-bird-flu/cdc-h5n1- >>> mutations-severely-ill-patient-could-boost-spread-risk-remains >>> >>> There has been a second severe case of H5N1 infection involving the D1.1 >>> genotype thousands of miles from each other. In British Columbia a >>> teenager was in critical condition with an H5N1 D1.1 infection. The >>> virus had two mutations that made it more infective in humans and it was >>> a respiratory infection in that case. The claim was that the two >>> mutations occurred in the infected individual and the mutant took over >>> to cause the severe infection. >>> >>> Another H5N1 D1.1 infection has occurred in Louisiana, and that patient >>> also has mutations that account for the severity of the infection, that >>> are not found among local wild birds, and they claim that they likely >>> occurred within that individual. Two such cases likely means that there >>> is either a human adapted variant already existing, or that these >>> mutations commonly occur, and the genotype D1.1 may already be a >>> respiratory infection, so the two mutations would already be replicating >>> in the tissue that they would better adapt the virus to infect. >>> >>> The Dairy virus is genotype B3.13. Half it's genome comes from two >>> other strains of influenza (one high path and one low path). D1.1 is >>> also a reassorted virus, but I can't find where the genotype is defined. >>> Both virus still retain the H5 and N1 genes of the Asian avian >>> influenza virus that had 50% mortality in infected humans, but some of >>> their genomes come from other virus strains. The dairy virus human >>> infections are mostly limited to eye infections, so the virus may not be >>> replicating in respiratory tissue. B3.13 is only one mutation away from >>> becoming more infective in humans, but somehow that mutation hasn't yet >>> occurred in any infected human. It may be that the mutation would not >>> have an advantage replicating in mammary glands and tear ducts. >>> >>> The D1.1 genotype is likely replicating in tissue where the mutations >>> would be selected for and would take over the infection of the host. >>> >>> The CDC is currently not differentiating the dairy infection from the >>> D1.1 infections, but they should track them separately. Both D1.1 >>> infected individuals are seriously ill, but the B3.13 infected >>> individuals only have mild symptoms, mostly eye irritation. >>> >>> https://www.cdc.gov/bird-flu/situation-summary/index.html >>> >> You should post this stuff to Bluesky or elsewhere with a greater reach >> than here. >> > Everything that I put up is already out on the web. I do make my own > comments about it. > > What is sad about this current fiasco is the suppression of the data, > and interpretations are suppressed of what is put out. I haven't seen > an epidemiological analysis of the viral sequences since the first one > put out early in the infection when only around 8 states had been > identified to be infected. They have all the sequences and should be > updating the phylogeny and determining how the virus is spreading at > least weekly, but that doesn't seem to be done. That first study pretty > clearly indicated that dairy workers were likely spreading the virus. > New Mexico, Kansas, and South Dakota had not gotten cattle from Texas, > but they had somehow been infected by Texas strains. Kansas and South > Dakota seemed to have been infected by the same viral lineage. The CDC > and USDA refused to establish worker testing and contact tracing. As > stupid as it may be contact tracing was only started in California and > resulted in the identification of a large number of infected dairies > indicating that all the other states had under estimated the infected > dairies in their states because they refused to look for them. The USDA > finally started to assist California in contact tracing, and found so > many infected herds that they claimed that they were going to start bulk > milk tank testing in all infected states, but that never happened. A > month later the USDA claimed that they were going to start bulk milk > tank testing in half a dozen states, and the list included some states > that had not admitted to have infected herds, but it left out the states > that should have been tested like Washington, Florida and Missouri that > were known to have the dairy virus in their states, but had not admitted > to having infected herds. > > The press seems to just parrot what the USDA and CDC put out. I still > can't understand why the October CDC article claiming that the virus > could survive the most common form of pasteurization has not gotten more > press coverage. The CDC article recommended that the milk supply should > be reevaluated (the FDA claim was that pasteurization killed the virus). > The FDA did respond immediately, but published a bogus protocol that > was asking for volunteer processing plants. Nothing has come out of the > FDA in the last 2 months. In order to test the milk supply adequately > the FDA needed to go to processing plants that were accepting infected > milk, evaluate the milk as it came in and after pasteurization. They > needed to evaluate the entire process to see if there were any weak > points like start up, maintenence, and shift changes. It only takes a > few gallons of milk to not be processed correctly to account for the > sick child in California and the Missouri patients that did not have > contact with cattle, but did drink milk, and if the CDC was correct and > viable infective virus is surviving the 72 degree C pasteurization, the > method needs to be modified so that it does kill all the virus > routinely. 99% effective is probably not effective enough. > > https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/30/11/24-0772_article > > QUOTE: > Abstract > Highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1) detected in dairy cows raises > concerns about milk safety. The effects of pasteurization-like > temperatures on influenza viruses in retail and unpasteurized milk > revealed virus resilience under certain conditions. Although > pasteurization contributes to viral inactivation, influenza A virus, > regardless of strain, displayed remarkable stability in pasteurized milk. > END QUOTE: > > They found that infective virus survived 72 degree for 15 to 20 seconds, > and survived as infective virus in refrigerated milk for 4 days (the > extent of the trial, the virus likely survives for more than 4 days). > > I do not understand why this study is not cited in the cases of the > California child and the two Missouri cases. The FDA is still silent > about their reevaluation of the milk supply that they claimed that they > were starting in early Nov.. The FDA claimed to be responding, but the > press never did. > > https://www.fda.gov/food/alerts-advisories-safety-information/ > investigation-avian-influenza-h5n1-virus-dairy-cattle > > QUOTE: > 10/3/2024 - Silo Study > Since the onset of the Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza A H5N1 (H5N1) > outbreak in dairy cattle earlier this year, researchers across the > federal and state governments have been working to understand the > prevalence of H5N1 in the U.S. milk supply. This week, states were > invited to participate in a new study that will generate data to aid in > the understanding of the prevalence of H5N1 in bulk raw cow’s milk > received by dairy processing facilities across the nation. Dubbed “the > silo study,” the information garnered from this research can help inform > the national strategy to control the spread of the virus to other dairy > cattle and avian flocks, and to identify any viral transformations. > END QUOTE: > > The FDA claims to have initiated the Silo study the day that the CDC > released their Nov. newsletter (Oct. 3rd) containing the research > article. The CDC and FDA had obviously been in contact before the > release of the CDC research article. In early Nov. the FDA claimed that > they were starting it, but it is now the end of December and nothing has > come out of this effort. If you read the research protocol you should > understand that the study was designed to fail to adequately test the > milk supply. The processing plants that do not volunteer that likely do > not have their plants up to specifications, and are more likely to have > other issues like training and quality control, are the plants that you > want to evaluate. You do not want volunteer dairies, but you want the > dairies sending in infected milk. Dairies are supposed to take sick > cows out of the milk supply. You want the dairies that are not doing a > good job of identifying sick cows, not the dairies that say it is OK to > test their milk. > > Ron Okimoto ========== REMAINDER OF ARTICLE TRUNCATED ==========