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Path: ...!feeds.phibee-telecom.net!3.eu.feeder.erje.net!feeder.erje.net!newsfeed.bofh.team!paganini.bofh.team!not-for-mail From: Stefan Claas <pollux@tilde.club> Newsgroups: sci.crypt Subject: Re: Ternary Encoding :-) Date: Thu, 2 Jan 2025 16:02:38 +0100 Organization: To protect and to server Message-ID: <vl69r0$3vb75$1@paganini.bofh.team> References: <vl243l$3jkpe$1@paganini.bofh.team> <vl3q7v$3mbq0$1@paganini.bofh.team> <vl418a$2sv2k$1@dont-email.me> <vl4el9$3ndf1$1@paganini.bofh.team> <vl4f3g$2vav0$3@dont-email.me> <vl4mjv$3sqb1$1@paganini.bofh.team> <vl54qf$36b5p$1@dont-email.me> <vl6770$3v5qv$2@paganini.bofh.team> Mime-Version: 1.0 Injection-Date: Thu, 2 Jan 2025 15:02:56 -0000 (UTC) Injection-Info: paganini.bofh.team; logging-data="4173029"; posting-host="WyaToOEEsx2UzvHb61/7Ew.user.paganini.bofh.team"; mail-complaints-to="usenet@bofh.team"; posting-account="9dIQLXBM7WM9KzA+yjdR4A"; User-Agent: flnews/1.3.0pre29 (for GNU/Linux) Cancel-Lock: sha1:+XZ4YM1s5k+yydHR3rGabNHJCKY= X-Date: It's Thu Sep 11447 04:02:38 PM CET 1993, the September that never ends. X-Ed25519-Sig: 5903d6b331550d24ec72ba8fb631b4d19f42c89ac1311e04696a4ad8f554a20d 808753cddfff3d3488d53a35d2276843ed14197d31cc0159f2aaba66b53e8505 X-Notice: Filtered by postfilter v. 0.9.3 X-Ed25519-Pub: c0ffee5a36e581eb10f60b2831b3cdb955d2e7ef680dd282a8d43ad8b84b357a Bytes: 4768 Lines: 80 Stefan Claas wrote: > Rich wrote: > > Stefan Claas <pollux@tilde.club> wrote: > > > Rich wrote: > > > > Stefan Claas <pollux@tilde.club> wrote: > > > > > Rich wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > Of course, this just brings to the front the OTP key distribution and > > > > > > key reuse problems. > > > > > > > > > > Forgot to mention, not with my programs, because also in this case I > > > > > can use for ternary xor encryption deterministic keys, valid for one > > > > > day (UTC +0000), so that border control does not find keys. :-) > > > > > > > > You'll have to explain further, as the above is not nearly enough > > > > explanation to understand what you are discussing. > > > > > > > > > I have made this a standard for some of my programs, because long ago > > > > > I thought of key distribution problems and looked for solutions, > > > > > which others afaik have not thought of (yet). > > > > > > > > Further explanation needed. > > > > > > Ok. You talked about key distribution problems with OTPs and management. > > > > > > I have Go programs which can generate as many random keys/pads per day > > > (UTC +0000) for my programs, based on a shared secret, consisting of > > > a password and salt. > > > > > > In order that this works Alice and Bob needs only one initial session, > > > where they transfer with a client/server program, which uses DHE/AES-GCM, > > > the shared secret via the Tor Network, to bypass third party servers > > > and NAT etc. > > > > > > Once the shared secret is transfered securely to Alice or Bob, they use > > > the key generation programs, which are deterministic. This means that > > > when Alice generates todays pads/keys she does not need to transfer them > > > to Bob, because Bob has the shared secret and can generate the same > > > determenistic keys for each day (UTC +0000). > > > > > > This procedure allows either Alice or Bob to travel, without worring that > > > some border patrol finds pads/keys, for daily usage, or If I would do > > > encryption with you without sending you pads in advance, via postal > > > service etc. > > > > Then the weakness here is this "generator algorithm". A OTP is only > > perfectly secure if the pads are true random sequences. > > > > Deterministic outputs from a seeded generator are not "true random > > sequences" so you will not gain the "unbreakable" aspect of a proper > > OTP. > > > > Will it likely be /good enough/ such that those of us left here are > > unlikely to break it: yes. Will it be good enough that one of the > > three-letter-agencies cannot break it: likely no. > > > > That is old saying , that it is only unbreakable with TRRNG. I believe > that nowadays PRNG can serve the purpose as well, for OTP encryption. > > What patterns would distinguish a TRNG and PRNG OTP sheet, if a > cryptanalist would look at them, or when looking at a couple of > more sheets? The difference is IMHO none. Example, 60 dice rolls from random.org and Go's crypto/rand random.org: 2 4 4 4 4 5 4 6 1 2 2 1 5 6 4 5 6 4 2 2 5 3 6 1 3 1 4 1 6 4 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 1 1 2 6 1 6 5 1 6 5 5 4 3 1 3 6 6 5 1 3 1 Go crypt/rand: 3 5 6 3 4 5 4 1 1 6 1 5 3 2 4 3 5 1 1 6 5 3 2 3 1 1 6 3 3 3 5 3 6 3 1 2 1 6 1 1 4 1 1 5 5 1 6 3 6 6 1 4 6 1 3 2 2 1 4 1 -- Regards Stefan