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Path: ...!news.roellig-ltd.de!open-news-network.org!weretis.net!feeder8.news.weretis.net!newsfeed.bofh.team!paganini.bofh.team!not-for-mail From: Stefan Claas <pollux@tilde.club> Newsgroups: sci.crypt Subject: Re: Ternary Encoding :-) Date: Thu, 2 Jan 2025 15:18:05 +0100 Organization: To protect and to server Message-ID: <vl6770$3v5qv$2@paganini.bofh.team> References: <vl243l$3jkpe$1@paganini.bofh.team> <vl3q7v$3mbq0$1@paganini.bofh.team> <vl418a$2sv2k$1@dont-email.me> <vl4el9$3ndf1$1@paganini.bofh.team> <vl4f3g$2vav0$3@dont-email.me> <vl4mjv$3sqb1$1@paganini.bofh.team> <vl54qf$36b5p$1@dont-email.me> Mime-Version: 1.0 Injection-Date: Thu, 2 Jan 2025 14:18:08 -0000 (UTC) Injection-Info: paganini.bofh.team; logging-data="4167519"; posting-host="WyaToOEEsx2UzvHb61/7Ew.user.paganini.bofh.team"; mail-complaints-to="usenet@bofh.team"; posting-account="9dIQLXBM7WM9KzA+yjdR4A"; User-Agent: flnews/1.3.0pre29 (for GNU/Linux) Cancel-Lock: sha1:x/7mjvxh8eIGjhiRbUImGxPmqZs= X-Notice: Filtered by postfilter v. 0.9.3 X-Ed25519-Sig: 620b0fb35a635445edf70e5a1cee3a00f1348ba5d818508e30213f3e442d17de 6804f61c69a262f95b6ca32bf547b17a146c1b3f47cb49196ce5ef54d43a900c X-Ed25519-Pub: c0ffee5a36e581eb10f60b2831b3cdb955d2e7ef680dd282a8d43ad8b84b357a X-Date: It's Thu Sep 11447 03:18:05 PM CET 1993, the September that never ends. Bytes: 4260 Lines: 65 Rich wrote: > Stefan Claas <pollux@tilde.club> wrote: > > Rich wrote: > > > Stefan Claas <pollux@tilde.club> wrote: > > > > Rich wrote: > > > > > > > > > Of course, this just brings to the front the OTP key distribution and > > > > > key reuse problems. > > > > > > > > Forgot to mention, not with my programs, because also in this case I > > > > can use for ternary xor encryption deterministic keys, valid for one > > > > day (UTC +0000), so that border control does not find keys. :-) > > > > > > You'll have to explain further, as the above is not nearly enough > > > explanation to understand what you are discussing. > > > > > > > I have made this a standard for some of my programs, because long ago > > > > I thought of key distribution problems and looked for solutions, > > > > which others afaik have not thought of (yet). > > > > > > Further explanation needed. > > > > Ok. You talked about key distribution problems with OTPs and management. > > > > I have Go programs which can generate as many random keys/pads per day > > (UTC +0000) for my programs, based on a shared secret, consisting of > > a password and salt. > > > > In order that this works Alice and Bob needs only one initial session, > > where they transfer with a client/server program, which uses DHE/AES-GCM, > > the shared secret via the Tor Network, to bypass third party servers > > and NAT etc. > > > > Once the shared secret is transfered securely to Alice or Bob, they use > > the key generation programs, which are deterministic. This means that > > when Alice generates todays pads/keys she does not need to transfer them > > to Bob, because Bob has the shared secret and can generate the same > > determenistic keys for each day (UTC +0000). > > > > This procedure allows either Alice or Bob to travel, without worring that > > some border patrol finds pads/keys, for daily usage, or If I would do > > encryption with you without sending you pads in advance, via postal > > service etc. > > Then the weakness here is this "generator algorithm". A OTP is only > perfectly secure if the pads are true random sequences. > > Deterministic outputs from a seeded generator are not "true random > sequences" so you will not gain the "unbreakable" aspect of a proper > OTP. > > Will it likely be /good enough/ such that those of us left here are > unlikely to break it: yes. Will it be good enough that one of the > three-letter-agencies cannot break it: likely no. > That is old saying , that it is only unbreakable with TRRNG. I believe that nowadays PRNG can serve the purpose as well, for OTP encryption. What patterns would distinguish a TRNG and PRNG OTP sheet, if a cryptanalist would look at them, or when looking at a couple of more sheets? The difference is IMHO none. -- Regards Stefan