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Path: news.eternal-september.org!eternal-september.org!.POSTED!not-for-mail From: olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> Newsgroups: sci.logic Subject: Re: Mathematical incompleteness has always been a misconception --- Tarski Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2025 08:56:29 -0600 Organization: A noiseless patient Spider Lines: 318 Message-ID: <voafmu$m3dj$2@dont-email.me> References: <vnh0sq$35mcm$1@dont-email.me> <vni4ta$3ek8m$1@dont-email.me> <vnikre$3hb19$1@dont-email.me> <vnkov9$1971$1@dont-email.me> <vnl9vj$4f8i$1@dont-email.me> <vnndqs$kef3$1@dont-email.me> <vnpd96$vl84$1@dont-email.me> <vnqm3p$1apip$1@dont-email.me> <vnqsbh$1c5sq$1@dont-email.me> <vnsm90$1pr86$1@dont-email.me> <vnte6s$1tra8$1@dont-email.me> <vnv4tf$2a43e$1@dont-email.me> <vo0249$2eqdl$1@dont-email.me> <vo1qae$2s4cr$1@dont-email.me> <vo2i10$302f0$1@dont-email.me> <vo4nj4$3f6so$1@dont-email.me> <vo5btf$3ipo2$1@dont-email.me> <vo7ckh$q2p$1@dont-email.me> <vo7tdg$36ra$6@dont-email.me> <voa09t$idij$1@dont-email.me> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Injection-Date: Sun, 09 Feb 2025 15:56:30 +0100 (CET) Injection-Info: dont-email.me; posting-host="0d7b7e128809f1e0bad2050f21bb5c16"; logging-data="724403"; mail-complaints-to="abuse@eternal-september.org"; posting-account="U2FsdGVkX1/8co9J5utOToBQ1qxTPNtM" User-Agent: Mozilla Thunderbird Cancel-Lock: sha1:QFRGxaNCL8W3dNL4az9jlZF9DEQ= X-Antivirus-Status: Clean Content-Language: en-US X-Antivirus: Norton (VPS 250209-2, 2/9/2025), Outbound message In-Reply-To: <voa09t$idij$1@dont-email.me> On 2/9/2025 4:33 AM, Mikko wrote: > On 2025-02-08 15:32:00 +0000, olcott said: > >> On 2/8/2025 4:45 AM, Mikko wrote: >>> On 2025-02-07 16:21:01 +0000, olcott said: >>> >>>> On 2/7/2025 4:34 AM, Mikko wrote: >>>>> On 2025-02-06 14:46:55 +0000, olcott said: >>>>> >>>>>> On 2/6/2025 2:02 AM, Mikko wrote: >>>>>>> On 2025-02-05 16:03:21 +0000, olcott said: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On 2/5/2025 1:44 AM, Mikko wrote: >>>>>>>>> On 2025-02-04 16:11:08 +0000, olcott said: >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> On 2/4/2025 3:22 AM, Mikko wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> On 2025-02-03 16:54:08 +0000, olcott said: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/3/2025 9:07 AM, Mikko wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2025-02-03 03:30:46 +0000, olcott said: >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/2/2025 3:27 AM, Mikko wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2025-02-01 14:09:54 +0000, olcott said: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2/1/2025 3:19 AM, Mikko wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2025-01-31 13:57:02 +0000, olcott said: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 1/31/2025 3:24 AM, Mikko wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2025-01-30 23:10:18 +0000, olcott said: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Within the entire body of analytical truth any >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expression of language that has no sequence of >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> formalized semantic deductive inference steps from >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the formalized semantic foundational truths of this >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> system are simply untrue in this system. (Isomorphic >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to provable from axioms). >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> If there is a misconception then you have >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> misconceived something. It is well >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> known that it is possible to construct a formal >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> theory where some formulas >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> are neither provble nor disprovable. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> This is well known. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> And well undeerstood. The claim on the subject line is >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> false. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a fact or piece of information that shows that something >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> exists or is true: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/ >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> proof >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> We require that terms of art are used with their term-of- >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> art meaning and >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> The fundamental base meaning of Truth[0] itself remains >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the same >>>>>>>>>>>>>> no matter what idiomatic meanings say. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Irrelevant as the subject line does not mention truth. >>>>>>>>>>>>> Therefore, no need to revise my initial comment. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> The notion of truth is entailed by the subject line: >>>>>>>>>>>> misconception means ~True. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> The title line means that something is misunderstood but that >>>>>>>>>>> something >>>>>>>>>>> is not the meaning of "true". >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> It is untrue because it is misunderstood. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Mathematical incompleteness is not a claim so it cannot be untrue. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> That mathematical incompleteness coherently exists <is> claim. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Yes, but you didn't claim that. >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> The closest that it can possibly be interpreted as true would >>>>>>>> be that because key elements of proof[0] have been specified >>>>>>>> as not existing in proof[math] math is intentionally made less >>>>>>>> than complete. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Math is not intentionally incomplete. >>>>>> >>>>>> You paraphrased what I said incorrectly. >>>>> >>>>> No, I did not paraphrase anything. >>>>> >>>>>> Proof[math] was defined to have less capability than Proof[0]. >>>>> >>>>> That is not a part of the definition but it is a consequence of the >>>>> definition. Much of the lost capability is about things that are >>>>> outside of the scope of mathemiatics and formal theories. >>>>> >>>> >>>> When one thinks of math as only pertaining to numbers then math >>>> is inherently very limited. >>> >>> That's right. That limited area should be called "number theory", >>> not "mathematics". >>> >>>> When one applies something like >>>> Montague Grammar to formalize every detail of natural language >>>> semantics then math takes on much more scope. >>> >>> It is not possible to specify every detail of a natural language. >>> In order to do so one should know every detail of a natural language. >>> While one is finding out the language changes so that the already >>> aquired knowledge is invalid. >>> >>>> When we see this then we see "incompleteness" is a mere artificial >>>> contrivance. >>> >>> Hallucinations are possible but only proofs count in mathematics. >>> >>>> True(x) always means that a connection to a semantic >>>> truthmaker exists. When math does this differently it is simply >>>> breaking the rules. >>> >>> Mathematics does not make anything about "True(x)". Some branches care >>> about semantic connections, some don't. Much of logic is about comparing >>> semantic connections to syntactic ones. >>> >>>>>>> Many theories are incomplete, >>>>>>> intertionally or otherwise, but they don't restrict the rest of >>>>>>> math. >>>>>>> But there are areas of matheimatics that are not yet studied. >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> When-so-ever any expression of formal or natural language X lacks >>>>>>>> a connection to its truthmaker X remains untrue. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> An expresion can be true in one interpretation and false in another. >>>>>> >>>>>> I am integrating the semantics into the evaluation as its full >>>>>> context. >>>>> >>>>> Then you cannot have all the advantages of formal logic. In >>>>> particular, >>>>> you need to be able to apply and verify formally invalid inferences. >>>> >>>> All of the rules of correct reasoning (correcting the errors of >>>> formal logic) are merely semantic connections between finite strings: >>> >>> There are no semantic connections between uninterpreted strings. >>> With different interpretations different connections can be found. >>> >> >> When we do not break the evaluation of an expression of language >> into its syntax and semantics such that these are evaluated >> separately and use something like Montague Semantics to formalize >> the semantics as relations between finite strings then >> >> it is clear that any expression of language that lacks a connection >> through a truthmaker to the semantics that makes it true simply remains >> untrue. > > Of course, completness can be achieved if language is sufficiently > restricted so that sufficiently many arithemtic truths become > inexpressible. > This does not make any sense to me. It is not that truth remains inexpressible. We simply make the system expressible enough that all of those truths made true through a truthmaker connection to their formalized semantic meaning can reach this semantic meaning. > It is far from clear that a theory of that kind can express all arithmetic ========== REMAINDER OF ARTICLE TRUNCATED ==========