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Path: news.eternal-september.org!eternal-september.org!.POSTED!not-for-mail From: Mikko <mikko.levanto@iki.fi> Newsgroups: sci.logic Subject: Re: Why Tarski is wrong --- Montague, Davidson and Knowledge Ontology providing situational context. Date: Wed, 19 Mar 2025 16:03:33 +0200 Organization: - Lines: 136 Message-ID: <vreirl$10s2d$1@dont-email.me> References: <vr7v51$2u81k$3@dont-email.me> <7db5f56a38a6b6eda2b63acc2568f5dedcc55efd@i2pn2.org> <vr9fp6$bv13$5@dont-email.me> <vrbss5$2j07c$1@dont-email.me> <vrc02r$2m5nk$1@dont-email.me> <vrd89u$3oqkg$2@dont-email.me> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Injection-Date: Wed, 19 Mar 2025 15:03:33 +0100 (CET) Injection-Info: dont-email.me; posting-host="decd6b9cbf61ad7ef6196e53b260ceae"; logging-data="1077325"; mail-complaints-to="abuse@eternal-september.org"; posting-account="U2FsdGVkX19NZM2t9/Vvx3NmIua/2RtE" User-Agent: Unison/2.2 Cancel-Lock: sha1:EZKal8WpLIizNp/yUCXQlWaNou4= On 2025-03-19 01:57:18 +0000, olcott said: > On 3/18/2025 9:30 AM, Mikko wrote: >> On 2025-03-18 13:36:04 +0000, olcott said: >> >>> On 3/18/2025 8:14 AM, Mikko wrote: >>>> On 2025-03-17 15:40:22 +0000, olcott said: >>>> >>>>> On 3/16/2025 9:51 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>> On 3/16/25 9:50 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>> On 3/16/2025 5:50 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>> On 3/16/25 11:12 AM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>> On 3/16/2025 7:36 AM, joes wrote: >>>>>>>>>> Am Sat, 15 Mar 2025 20:43:11 -0500 schrieb olcott: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> We can define a correct True(X) predicate that always succeeds except >>>>>>>>>>> for unknowns and untruths, Tarski WAS WRONG !!! >>>>>>>>>> That does not disprove Tarski. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> He said that this is impossible and no >>>>>>>>> counter-examples exists that shows that I am wrong. >>>>>>>>> True(GC) == FALSE Cannot be proven true AKA unknown >>>>>>>>> True(LP) == FALSE Not a truth-bearer >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> But if x is what you are saying is >>>>>>> >>>>>>> A True(X) predicate can be defined and Tarski never >>>>>>> showed that it cannot. >>>>>> >>>>>> Sure he did. Using a mathematical system like Godel, we can construct a >>>>>> statement x, which is only true it is the case that True(x) is false, >>>>>> but this interperetation can only be seen in the metalanguage created >>>>>> from the language in the proof, similar to Godel meta that generates >>>>>> the proof testing relationship that shows that G can only be true if it >>>>>> can not be proven as the existance of a number to make it false, >>>>>> becomes a proof that the statement is true and thus creates a >>>>>> contradiction in the system. >>>>>> >>>>>> That you can't understand that, or get confused by what is in the >>>>>> language, which your True predicate can look at, and in the >>>>>> metalanguage, which it can not, but still you make bold statements that >>>>>> you can not prove, and have been pointed out to be wrong, just shows >>>>>> how stupid you are. >>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> True(X) only returns TRUE when a a sequence of truth >>>>>>> preserving operations can derive X from the set of basic >>>>>>> facts and returns false otherwise. >>>>>> >>>>>> Right, but needs to do so even if the path to x is infinite in length. >>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> This never fails on the entire set of human general >>>>>>> knowledge that can be expressed using language. >>>>>> >>>>>> But that isn't a logic system, so you are just proving your stupidity. >>>>>> >>>>>> Note, "The Entire set of Human General Knowledge" does not contain the >>>>>> contents of Meta-systems like Tarski uses, as there are an infinite >>>>>> number of them possible, and thus to even try to express them all >>>>>> requires an infinite number of axioms, and thus your system fails to >>>>>> meet the requirements. Once you don't have the meta-systems, Tarski >>>>>> proof can create a metasystem, that you system doesn't know about, >>>>>> which creates the problem statement. >>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> It is not fooled by pathological self-reference or >>>>>>> self-contradiction. >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Of course it is, because it can't detect all forms of such references. >>>>>> >>>>>> And, even if it does detect it, what answer does True(x) produce when >>>>>> we have designed (via a metalanguage) that the statement x in the >>>>>> language will be true if and only if !True(x), which he showed can be >>>>>> done in ANY system with sufficient power, which your universal system >>>>>> must have. >>>>>> >>>>>> Sorry, you are just showing how little you understand what you are >>>>>> talking about. >>>>> >>>>> We need no metalanguage. A single formalized natural >>>>> language can express its own semantics as connections >>>>> between expressions of this same language. >>>> >>>> A nice formal language has the symbols and syntax of the first order logic >>>> with equivalence and the following additional symbols: >>> >>> I am not talking about a trivially simple formal >>> language. I am talking about very significant >>> extensions to something like Montague grammar. >> >> That kind of language should be able to express some kind of semantics >> of itself. But it may be hard to prevent a different interpretaion of >> the same language from specifying different semantics for itself. >> > > All of the semantics is formalized syntactically with no > separate interpretation needed that is why Montague semantics > is called Montague Grammar. Assuming that the intended semantic of Montague Grammar is applied. If you apply different semantics a different result may be possible. > It is all formalizes as relations between finite strings that > may be abbreviated as GUIDs. > >>> The language must be expressive enough to fully >>> encode any and all details of each element of the >>> entire body of human general knowledge that can >>> be expressed using language. Davidson semantics >>> provides another encoding. >> >> Including future additions to human general knowledge. >> > YES > >>> To address the objection to these forms of encoding >>> that they ignore the important source of meaning >>> of linguistics pragmatics context, what I am proposing >>> also includes a situation specific knowledge ontology >>> that directly encode the full context of the specific >>> situation. >> >> Your proposal means a lot of work and therefore a long time. > > Not with LLM systems. Even with them. Of course having powerful tools helps. -- Mikko