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Path: ...!eternal-september.org!feeder3.eternal-september.org!news.eternal-september.org!eternal-september.org!.POSTED!not-for-mail From: Mikko <mikko.levanto@iki.fi> Newsgroups: comp.theory Subject: Re: Why Tarski is wrong --- Montague, Davidson and Knowledge Ontology providing situational context. Date: Fri, 21 Mar 2025 10:11:46 +0200 Organization: - Lines: 164 Message-ID: <vrj702$14v65$1@dont-email.me> References: <vr1shq$1qopn$1@dont-email.me> <vr2m8j$2deaa$7@dont-email.me> <vr2mji$2d3ah$5@dont-email.me> <vr2qmt$2ij53$1@dont-email.me> <vr2r34$2d3ah$7@dont-email.me> <vr2tti$2kq04$3@dont-email.me> <vr3u4l$3idjs$2@dont-email.me> <vr4kkr$48ff$2@dont-email.me> <7f68c434c15abfc9d4b645992344f0e851f031a3@i2pn2.org> <vr4t3e$bkso$5@dont-email.me> <vr50bg$ed3o$5@dont-email.me> <vr5abg$m5ov$6@dont-email.me> <8ea8c8f1c661d0f2eef855af9b4c171d4f574826@i2pn2.org> <vr6po4$1udpn$7@dont-email.me> <4965dcbb84fc29c9ba9d3cea39b59a8608bfeb66@i2pn2.org> <vr7v51$2u81k$3@dont-email.me> <7db5f56a38a6b6eda2b63acc2568f5dedcc55efd@i2pn2.org> <vr9fp6$bv13$5@dont-email.me> <vrbrkd$2ii4j$1@dont-email.me> <vrbss5$2j07c$1@dont-email.me> <2dd0fa97e2387ba4bca36b40ca16925933b35d9a@i2pn2.org> <vrfe7q$1oabl$1@dont-email.me> <0e92642bf4519e50ba48d51b52d17749c6e19664@i2pn2.org> <vri3va$3egq$1@dont-email.me> <9495b0ea31b3c2559cf9515bfabe071d48cc9d39@i2pn2.org> <vrinjq$kefg$2@dont-email.me> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Injection-Date: Fri, 21 Mar 2025 09:11:47 +0100 (CET) Injection-Info: dont-email.me; posting-host="cae169de1f4b106dcdbefb0dc8de4776"; logging-data="1211589"; mail-complaints-to="abuse@eternal-september.org"; posting-account="U2FsdGVkX1/5HpeXldl762iJXNZ3NXbG" User-Agent: Unison/2.2 Cancel-Lock: sha1:9bWbP7m0ZdJsZVjlfqQ01FOw5sg= Bytes: 9143 On 2025-03-21 03:49:14 +0000, olcott said: > On 3/20/2025 8:31 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >> On 3/20/25 6:14 PM, olcott wrote: >>> On 3/19/2025 8:59 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>> On 3/19/25 5:50 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>> On 3/18/2025 10:04 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>> On 3/18/25 9:36 AM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>> On 3/18/2025 8:14 AM, Mikko wrote: >>>>>>>> On 2025-03-17 15:40:22 +0000, olcott said: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> On 3/16/2025 9:51 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>> On 3/16/25 9:50 PM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> On 3/16/2025 5:50 PM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>> On 3/16/25 11:12 AM, olcott wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>> On 3/16/2025 7:36 AM, joes wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Am Sat, 15 Mar 2025 20:43:11 -0500 schrieb olcott: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> We can define a correct True(X) predicate that always succeeds except >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for unknowns and untruths, Tarski WAS WRONG !!! >>>>>>>>>>>>>> That does not disprove Tarski. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> He said that this is impossible and no >>>>>>>>>>>>> counter-examples exists that shows that I am wrong. >>>>>>>>>>>>> True(GC) == FALSE Cannot be proven true AKA unknown >>>>>>>>>>>>> True(LP) == FALSE Not a truth-bearer >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> But if x is what you are saying is >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> A True(X) predicate can be defined and Tarski never >>>>>>>>>>> showed that it cannot. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Sure he did. Using a mathematical system like Godel, we can construct a >>>>>>>>>> statement x, which is only true it is the case that True(x) is false, >>>>>>>>>> but this interperetation can only be seen in the metalanguage created >>>>>>>>>> from the language in the proof, similar to Godel meta that generates >>>>>>>>>> the proof testing relationship that shows that G can only be true if it >>>>>>>>>> can not be proven as the existance of a number to make it false, >>>>>>>>>> becomes a proof that the statement is true and thus creates a >>>>>>>>>> contradiction in the system. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> That you can't understand that, or get confused by what is in the >>>>>>>>>> language, which your True predicate can look at, and in the >>>>>>>>>> metalanguage, which it can not, but still you make bold statements that >>>>>>>>>> you can not prove, and have been pointed out to be wrong, just shows >>>>>>>>>> how stupid you are. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> True(X) only returns TRUE when a a sequence of truth >>>>>>>>>>> preserving operations can derive X from the set of basic >>>>>>>>>>> facts and returns false otherwise. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Right, but needs to do so even if the path to x is infinite in length. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> This never fails on the entire set of human general >>>>>>>>>>> knowledge that can be expressed using language. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> But that isn't a logic system, so you are just proving your stupidity. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Note, "The Entire set of Human General Knowledge" does not contain the >>>>>>>>>> contents of Meta-systems like Tarski uses, as there are an infinite >>>>>>>>>> number of them possible, and thus to even try to express them all >>>>>>>>>> requires an infinite number of axioms, and thus your system fails to >>>>>>>>>> meet the requirements. Once you don't have the meta- systems, Tarski >>>>>>>>>> proof can create a metasystem, that you system doesn't know about, >>>>>>>>>> which creates the problem statement. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> It is not fooled by pathological self-reference or >>>>>>>>>>> self-contradiction. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Of course it is, because it can't detect all forms of such references. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> And, even if it does detect it, what answer does True(x) produce when >>>>>>>>>> we have designed (via a metalanguage) that the statement x in the >>>>>>>>>> language will be true if and only if ! True(x), which he showed can be >>>>>>>>>> done in ANY system with sufficient power, which your universal system >>>>>>>>>> must have. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Sorry, you are just showing how little you understand what you are >>>>>>>>>> talking about. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> We need no metalanguage. A single formalized natural >>>>>>>>> language can express its own semantics as connections >>>>>>>>> between expressions of this same language. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> A nice formal language has the symbols and syntax of the first order logic >>>>>>>> with equivalence and the following additional symbols: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I am not talking about a trivially simple formal >>>>>>> language. I am talking about very significant >>>>>>> extensions to something like Montague grammar. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> The language must be expressive enough to fully >>>>>>> encode any and all details of each element of the >>>>>>> entire body of human general knowledge that can >>>>>>> be expressed using language. Davidson semantics >>>>>>> provides another encoding. >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> But "encoding" knowledge, isn't a logic system. >>>>> Unless you bother to pay attention to the details >>>>> of how this of encoded. >>>> >>>> But "Encoded Knowledge" isn't a logic system. PERIOD. BYU DEFINITION. >>>> That would just be a set of axioms. Note, Logic system must also have a >>>> set of rules of relationships and how to manipulate them, >>> >>> Yes stupid I already specified those 150 times. >>> TRUTH PRESERVING OPERATIONS. >>> >>>> and that needs more that just expressing them as knowledge. >>>> >>> >>> NOT AT ALL DUMB BUNNY, for all the expressions >>> that are proved completely true entirely on the basis of >>> their meaning expressed in language they only need a >>> connection this semantic meaning to prove that they >>> are true. >>> >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Part of the problem is that most of what we call "Human Knowledge" >>>>>> isn't logically defined truth, but is just "Emperical Knowledge", for >>>>>> which we >>>>> >>>>> The set of human knowledge that can be expressed >>>>> in language provides the means to compute True(X). >>>> >>>> Of course not, as then True(x) just can't handle a statement whose >>>> truth is currently unknown, which it MUST be able to handle >>>> >>> >>> It employs the same algorithm as Prolog: >>> Can X be proven on the basis of Facts? >> >> And thus you just admitted that your system doesn't even QUALIFY to be >> the system that Tarski is talking about. >> >> You don't seem to understand that fact, because apparently you can't >> actually understand any logic system more coplicated than what Prolog >> can handle. >> > > This concise specification is air-tight. > The set of all human general knowledge that can be expressed > using language has no undecidability or undefinability. Of course it has. Meanings of the words "undecidability" and "undefinability" and related words are a part of human knowledge, and so are Gödel's completeness and incopleteness theorems as well as Tarski's undefinability theorem. Another part of human knowledge is that there are fools that try to argue against proven theorems. -- Mikko